Macé, Arnaud. 2019. "Ordering the Universe in Speech. Kosmos and Diakosmos in Parmenides’ Poem." In Cosmos in the Ancient World, edited by Horky, Phillip Sidney, 42-61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"My hypothesis is that Parmenides, who chose to express himself in the verse, vocabulary, and images ofHomer, can be chiefly credited with making the categories of Archaic poetry available for cosmology,

so that the universe could start to openly be described as another κόσμος that resulted from the process described by the verbs κοσμέω and διακοσμέω.

Only such a daring move could have opened the way to call the universe simply a ‘kosmos’, or even the kosmos.

My further claim is that Parmenides is able to bring the universe into the list of items that a poet would call well-ordered precisely because he exposes and criticises the traditional epic relation of word to reality: a well-ordered song is one that tells the truth about what actually happened, its order fitting the order of reality itself. I would like to suggest that the way Parmenides weaves κόσμος and διακόσμος together at the end of B 8 both exposes and denounces the claim that a combination of verses, a κόσμος ἐπέων, should be expected to turn into the disclosure of a διάκοσμος. Only this time the great ordering is not the catalogue of ships ready for battle, but the division of the great principles according to which the universe is organised by mortals. Parmenides exposes the delusion of a song claiming to disclose the organisation of the whole of reality, ordered like the armies of the Achaeans. Such an approach changes the way we look at the status of cosmology and cosmogony in Parmenides: we usually think it should either be true and consistent or false and inconsistent. Parmenides shows us how human words, projecting human practices and institutions on the universe, make it a very consistent order – and all the more deceitful because of its consistency." (pp. 42-43, notes omitted)
Mackenzie, Mary Margaret. 1982. "Parmenides' Dilemma." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 27:1-12.

Reprinted in M. M. McCabe, Platonic Conversations, New York Oxford University Press 2015, pp. 73-82.

Abstract: "Parmenides the Eleatic wrote a treatise which intrigued, puzzled and confounded the later philosophical tradition.(2) In it, he argued for a strong monism: what there is, is eternal, complete, immoveable and unvarying, one and homogeneous (DK 28B 8.3-6).(3) All the rest, the world of perceptible things, is contradictory - or an illusion.

Strong monism is frighteningly radical. So Parmenides left a series of problems in his wake, some of which have proved so recalcitrant as to be dismissed with that counsel of despair 'it's a dialectical device'.(4) This paper addresses two of those problems, and recasts the dialectical device in a mood of optimism."

(2) The secondary literature on Parmenides is extensive: cf. bibliographies in J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, Vol.1 (London: 1979) (PP) and A.P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (New Haven: 1970). Like many students of ancient philosophy, I have benefited most of all from the work of G.E.L. Owen; see, for example, his classic 'Eleatic Questions' (EQ) in R.E. Allen and D.J. Furley eds. Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, Vol.II (London: 1975), 48-81: or 'Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present' in A.P.D. Mourelatos, ed, The Presocratics (New York: 1974). 271-292.

(3) All references to H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Zurich: 1968) (DK).

(4) Cf. Owen, EQ, 54.
Mackenzie, Tom. 2017. "Parmenides and early Greek Allegory." Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici no. 79:31-59.

Abstract: "This article offers a new approach to the question of the alle- gorical status of Parmenides' poem, and suggests a new interpretation of the problematic line B8.53. It is argued that disagreements over whether Parmenides uses allegory arise from scholars using the term in different senses. An overview of the early Greek understanding of allegory sug- gests that Parmenides' poem can tentatively be seen as the most extended instance of allegorical composition in early Greek literature."
———. 2021. Poetry and Poetics in the Presocratic philosophers: Reading Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles as Literature Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 2 Parmenides, pp. 65-101.

"Since Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles are retrospectively categorised as philosophers, there has often been an implicit assumption that they cannot be poets in any more essential sense than that they

happen to use verse. Consequently, they are relatively neglected by scholars of Greek poetry.

In light of this neglect, the present study applies methods from modern literary criticism of ancient poetry to the texts of these three authors, whilst also remaining sensitive to their philosophical significance, in an attempt to explain what sorts of experiences they could provide to the attentive listener and by what methods. In the following chapters, I enlist a range of historical and archaeological evidence that might seem superfluous for the history of philosophy to help reconstruct the wider cultural norms that could affect an audience’s response." (p.4, notes omitted)

(...)

"Chapter 2 offers a reading of Parmenides’ proem within the context of other ancient accounts of supernatural journeys to places beyond the usual mortal realm, including some Near Eastern examples from outside the Greek tradition. Although these examples were almost certainly unfamiliar to Parmenides and his audiences, they originated from an ancient literary culture which was broadly similar to, and had at least some points of contact with, that of the Greeks. They are therefore taken as evidence for the sorts of narratives which could have been familiar and so can elucidate the connotations and particularities of Parmenides’ text." (p. 5, a note omitted)
Maddox, Graham. 2011. "The spell of Parmenides and the paradox of the commonwealth." History of Political Thought no. 32:253-279.

Abstract: "Given the dominance of the United States' constitutional tradition, the modern world has inherited a widespread conservatism that holds constitutional 'reform' to be risky and change to mean decline. This attitude has ancient roots. Atavism in politics may be traced to movements that draw (however remotely) upon the legacy of the presocratic philosopher, Parmenides, who promoted a monist view of the world and graphically represented a radical rejection of all change as mere illusion. As one of the forerunners of the immeasurably influential Plato and Aristotle, he helped to shape a philosophical worldview in which the ultimate reality was locked in a realm of disembodied and unchanging Forms. Despite his 'new modes and orders', archaism is apparent in Machiavelli's constitutional inheritance from Polybius, who sought to arrest change through a blending of the 'given' forms of government. This mixed constitution is inherently not conducive to democratic development."
Makin, Stephen. 2014. "Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus." In The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, edited by Warren, James and Sheffield, Frisbee, 126-158. New York: Routledge.

Abstract: "Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus, philosophers of the fifth century BC, are often grouped together by scholars. They are sometimes referred to collectively as the Eleatics, after Elea in southern Italy, the home city of both Parmenides and Zeno (Melissus came from

the Greek island of Samos). The connection between them is generally taken to turn on an opaque set of views enunciated by the earliest of the three, Parmenides. Each of the three can be taken as representative of a distinct philosophical strategy. Parmenides was an innovator, in that he offered positive arguments for a novel and provocative set of views about the nature of reality. Zeno was a defender, in that he attacked those who thought Parmenides’ ideas sufficiently absurd that they could be rejected out of hand. Melissus developed Parmenides’ thought by arguing, often in fresh ways, for views which, while fundamentally Parmenidean, differed in some details from those originally set out by Parmenides. I will accept this framework in what follows, although this account of the relation between Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus is not universally accepted. (See Plato’s Parmenides 126b–129a for the source of the view of Zeno as a defender of Parmenides; for critical discussion see Solmsen 1971, Vlastos 1975, Barnes 1982: 234–237; on Parmenides and Melissus see Palmer 2004; for a treatment of all three see Palmer 2009: Chapter 5.)" (p. 34)

Bibliography

Barnes, J. (1982), The Presocratic Philosophers (revised single volume edition), London: Routledge

Solmsen, F. (1971), “The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-examined”, Phronesis 16: 116–141

Palmer, J. (2004), “Melissus and Parmenides”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26: 19–54

Palmer, J. (2009), Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Vlastos, G. (1975), “Plato’s Testimony Concerning Zeno of Elea”, Journal of Hellenic Studies 95: 136–163
Malcolm, John. 1991. "On Avoiding the Void." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 19:75-94.

"Several prominent scholars have maintained that a denial of empty space, or the void, is crucial to Parmenides' rejection of plurality and locomotion.' Plurality, for example, implies divisibility but there is no what is not (or void) to separate one supposed portion of what is from another. Hence what is is one. Locomotion, also, might well appear to need some (empty) room for manoeuvre, but such is precluded by the proclaimed 'fullness' of what is.

Recently, however, interpreters of Parmenides have not been convinced that an appeal to the non-existence of a void plays a role in his denial of locomotion and plurality. The void is in fact never explicitly mentioned in his poem. More importantly, to introduce the void weakens Parmenides' position, for a plenum may he regarded as permitting both locomotion and plurality -- a situation adopted by his successors Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Moreover, at B 8. 22 Parmenides asserts that there cannot be any distinctions within what is and this principle is strong enough to preclude any locomotion or plurality. This renders an appeal to the absence of the void unnecessary as well as insufficient.

Let me expand on this latter point with regard to both locomotion and plurality. In so doing I shall accept certain assumptions which shall require (and receive) subsequent identification and defence." (pp. 75-76, notes omitted)
———. 2006. "Some Cautionary Remarks on the 'Is'/'Teaches' Analogy." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 31:281-296.

"Parmenides says that ‘what is not’ cannot be thought of or expressed (fragments 2, 3, 6). Though there is no explicit filling after the forms of einai, let us not read them as ‘exists’, but let us see how far we can get without committing Parmenides to the view that we cannot think of, or refer in speech to, what does not exist.(10) If we understand an ellipsis and take the traditional alternative, the copula, Parmenides’ dictum seems obviously true. If we cannot ascribe attributes to something, we cannot conceive of it (but see n. 7 above).

By excluding not being Parmenides (fragment 8) derives an impressive(11) series of characteristics of Being. Most of these, i.e. one, unchanging, continuous, indivisible, and homogeneous, follow directly from the denial of di·erentiation. I shall urge that this key move is best read as taking being as incomplete, not as existence." (p. 284)

(7) Kahn, ‘Return’, 386, quotes Plotinus as denying being to the One. He reads this as removing all predicative being, but not existence, from that sublime entity. It is unclear tome how this interpretation harmonizes with the view, which he champions, that the ancients did not (implicitly) distinguish existence from predication.

(10) As against e.g. D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea: Fragments (Toronto, 1984), 8.

Brown (217–18) clearly presents the paradoxical results of limiting esti to ‘exists’.

(11) For Brown, ‘startling’ (216).

Works cited:

Brown, L., ‘Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry’ [‘Enquiry’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 4 (1986), 49–70.

‘The Verb “to be” in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks’ [‘Verb’], in S. Everson (ed.), Language (Companions to Ancient Thought, 3; Cambridge, 1994), 212–236.

Kahn, C., ‘A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of Being’ [‘Return’], Ancient Philosophy, 24 (2004), 381–405.
Maly, Kenneth. 1985. "Parmenides: Circle of Disclosure, Circle of Possibility." Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien no. 1:5-23.

"In order to follow up on these questions that move from Heidegger's thinking to the word of Parmenides, this essay will first take up the questions raised here - metaphysics, Greek thinking, our return to original Greek thinking, and the task of dismantling - by tending to the word of Parmenides in more recent texts of Heidegger's - specifically by tending to a certain reverberation of Heidegger's lecture "The End of Philosophy and the Task for Thinking" in the text Vier Seminare (Part I). Then this essay will take up the issue of ἀλήθεια/Unverborgenheit/disclosure as a Parmenidean image of possibility by tending to the word of Parmenides in Heidegger's lecture course of 1942-43 - specifically by a careful reading of the published text of that course, Volume 54 of the Gesamtausgabe , entitled Parmenides (Part II)." (p. 6)
Manchester, Peter. 1979. "Parmenides and the Need for Eternity." The Monist no. 62:81-106.

"Greek ontology eventually developed a notion variously described as 'timeless', 'atemporal', or 'non-durational' eternity. In Proclus and Simplicius it is already a school-commonplace, with a stable vocabulary in which aion (eternity) is sharply distinguished from what is merely aidios (everlasting, occupying all times). Plotinus had perfected this notion beforehand, believing not only that he found it in Plato, but that Plato had developed it on Parmenidean grounds.

Until the last twenty years or so historians generally shared that view, on the ground of verbal agreement among familiar texts from Parmenides, Plato and the Neoplatonists.

(...)

But the criticism which distrusts the retrojection, via verbal agreement, of later conceptions into earlier argumentation has had this whole 'tradition' under intense scrutiny lately, and it has not held up uniformly well. It is no longer always conceded that the aion of Timaeus or the aei on of more common Platonic usage are nondurational, and there is increasingly frequent unwillingness to read an argument against duration in the Parmenides of our fragments.(1)" (P. 81)

"Parmenides contrived a discourse that had a different means of surviving verbatim than that of Heraclitan epigram, but survive it has. The proposal of this paper is that its treatment of time stabilizes it, provides the 'negative feedback' that holds the text homeostatic against millennia of emenders.

But what about eternity? Not the theological eternity, connected with divine omniscience and with theodicy, but the Greek ontological notion. Eternity, the Now of the All One, is not 'non-time' but the paradigm for the timelikeness of numbered time." (pp. 99-100)

(1) W. Kneale, "Time and Eternity in Theology," Aristotelian Society, Proceedings (NS) 61 (1960-61), pp. 87-108.
———. 2005. The Syntax of Time: The Phenomenology of Time in Greek Physics and Speculative Logic from Iamblichus to Anaximander. Leiden: Brill.

Chapter Four: Parmenides: time as the now, pp. 106-135; Appendix 2; The Poem of Parmendies, Fragment 8, pp. 170-173.

"The best place to look for how Parmenides thinks about time is the passage in which he actually refers to it:

34 The same: to think, and wherefore is the thought-upon

35 For not apart from being, in which it is what has been uttered,

36 will you find thinking, as little as if time is or is going to be

37 other outside of being, since fate has shackled it

38a whole and quiescent to be.(1)

This text is not regularly taken into consideration as concerns the theme of ‘time in Parmenides’ because the inclusion of the Greek word for time, χρόνος, in line 36 is judged to be impossible. Still, it is is exactly what we expect and need.

These lines are the first half of what I refer to as Signpost 3, the third of four blocks of text that answer to a four line programmatic summary."

(1) 1 The construction of the passage is part of my translation of the whole of Fragment 8, presented along with the Greek from Simplicius in Appendix 2. It is defended in what follows. Line numbers are those of Fr. 8 (DK). The Greek for groups of lines will not be cited in this chapter, since it can be consulted in the appendix. The structure of the fragment for which I argue is also made apparent there.
Mansfeld, Jaap. 1981. "Hesiod and Parmenides in Nag Hammadi." Vigiliae Christianae no. 35:174-182.

"We have noticed that, in Plutarch, Parmenides' cosmogonic Eros plays an important part and that he also says that Parmenides spoke of a cosmogonic Aphrodite. This is Plutarch's name for the anonymous goddess who in Parmenides creates Eros (Vorsokr. Fr. 28B13, quoted Amat. 756 F29). The activities of this goddess are described in some detail in a fragment of Parmenides preserved by Simplicius only (Vorsokr. Fr. 28B12), and in a non-verbal quotation by the same Simplicius (In Phys., p. 39, 20-1, cf. Vorsokr. ad Fr. 28B13).

Surprisingly, a substantial portion of the hymnic description of Eros in NHC 11, 5, is strikingly parallel to these Parmenidean passages:

NHC II [Nag Hammadi Codex II], 5, 109, 16ff. - Parmenides B12, 1-3; 4-5." (p. 179, notes omitted)

"Yet I am not going to argue that the author of NHC 11, 5 had read Parmenides, any more than he had read Hesiod. Above, I have suggested that the person responsible for the Gnostic treatise in the form in which it has come down to us was influenced by Greek literature

comparable as to its contents to passages in Plutarch." (p. 180)
———. 1981. "Bad world and demiurge. A «gnostic» motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo." In Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions Presented to Gilles Quispel on the occasion of His 65th Birthday, edited by Van den Broek, Roelof and Vermaseren, Maarten J., 261-314. Leiden: Brill.

"Consequently, what I propose to do in the present paper is to open up the following question: is it possible, in Greek philosophy before the Christian era, to indicate elements or features which even a slight

familiarity with the main tenets of Gnosticism may help us to understand somewhat better?" (pp. 262-263)

(...)

"Helped by 'Gnostic' hindsight, one may reconsider the thought of the great Parmenides.

(...)

"This raises a very difficult problem - one which, without overstatement, may be called the conundrum of the interpretation of Parmenides. If the inviolability of Being is vouchsafed by divine powers and if, indeed, according to Parmenides, it is absolutely unthinkable that this should not be the case, in what way, then, is a confusion - both ontic and epistemic - between Being and not-Being possible? If Parmenides had remained silent about the universe, our exegetic problem would be minimal, but he gives us, in the second part of his poem, a cosmogony and cosmology which constitute a serious, original, and even influential theory of 'nature' in the Presocratic sense of the world (cf. also the goddess' announcement, Fr. 28B1, 28-32)." (pp. 263-264)
———. 1994. "The Rhetoric in the Poem of Parmenides." In Filosofia, politica, retorica. Intersezioni possibili, edited by Bertelli, Lucio and Donini, Pierluigi, 1-11. Milano: Franco Angeli.

"In the present paper, I wish to argue that Parmenides not only uses means we may call logical, but also avails himself of means we may call rhetorical. His logic is not a formal logic or logica docens, but a logica utens. In the same way, his rhetoric is not a rhetorica docens (not yet a τέχνη, as Aristotle would say) but a rhetorica utens. Aristotle, at the beginning of his Rhetoric, actually uses the concept of a rhetorica utens, for he points out that rhetoric and dialectic are very closely related and that all men, more or less, make use of both, either at random or from practice or acquired habit. It is this natural endowment which forms the basis of the art (1)." (p. 1)

(...)

"We may safely conclude that Parmenides wanted to convince his audience in every way possible not only by means of argument, but also by using every possible rhetorical effect. This explains why the concept of ‘conviction’ (and a number of words relating to this concept) occupies a key position in the poem (epanodos again); actually, the word for conviction and its relatives are even used as a means of conviction (41).

The maidens «knowingly persuade» the watcher at the Gate by using «blandishing arguments» (B1. 15-6): they know how to argue and to get their way (42). Truth is most persuasive (ευπειθεος), whereas there is no true πιστις (43) in the views of men (B1.29-30). The way of ‘what there is’ is the way of conviction (πετθους B2.4). It is the power of niorig which prevents something to come to be from what is not there (B8.12 ff.). True πιστις has driven away coming to be and passing away (B8.28-9). What mortals believe (πεποιθοτες) to be true is not so (B8.39b ff., cf. B1.30). The account of truth provided by the goddess and its comprehension is πιστος (B8.50-1).

This πιστις, one should point out, is brought about by rigorous argument; it is caused by proof. True. It does make a difference whether one is convinced by rhetorical means, or is so by logical means. But, as Aristotle says, a rhetorical proof (nioTu;) is a kind of proof, and we are most fully persuaded when we assume that something has been proved (44). Often enough, the proofs in the poem involving πιστις are addressed ad hominem, that is to say are expressed in contexts containing the personal pronouns you and me (45), or verbs in the second or first person. The goddess is addressing her one-man public; the greater part of the poem is a formal logos (in verse) pronounced by her. What we would call logical proof is her most important instrument of conviction in the Way of Truth, but it is again and again presented as precisely such an instrument. In Parmenides’ day, logica and rhetorica were still in their pre-technical stage of development and, in Aristotle’s words, existed only as interrelated natural endowments. Parmenides of course knows what he is doing. Yet I would argue that for him the difference between rhetoric and logic was not as important as it would become in later times. Today, rhetorical and informal means of argument and of bringing about conviction have again become the object of serious study. But this is not my subject.*

(1) Arist, Rhet. A 1,1354a1 ff.

(41) I have learned much from A.P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (New Haven and London 1970), 136 ff., but prefer an interpretation that is a bit more superficial.

(42) Cf. my paper cited above, n. 17, 274. [Cf. J. Mansfeld, "Bad World and Demiurge: A 'gnostic' Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo", in M. J. Vermaseren and Roel B. Broek (eds.), Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, Leiden 1981, repr. as Study XIV in Id., Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism, CS 292, London 1989), 273 n. 29.]

(43) Although I am as a rule opposed to Wortphilologie, I wish to remined the reader of the importance of this term in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

(44) Rhet. 1.1.1355a4-6, Since it is evident that artistic method is concerned with pisteis and since pistis is a sort of demonstration [apodeixis] (*)

(45) See above, n. 27.

(*) Translation by George A. Kennedy; Mansfeld cite the Greek text.
———. 2005. "Minima Parmenidea." Mnemosyne no. 58:554-560.

Reprinted in J. Mansfeld, Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 177-184.

Critical and exegetical notes on on the following Fragments from Hermann Diels, Walther Kranz (eds.), Fragmente der Vorsokratiker:

1. A Handicap Fr. B1.22-3a; 2. A Subject Fr. B2 1-5; 3. A Way B6.3; 4. Changing Place and Colour B 8.38-41.
———. 2008. "A crux in Parmenides fr. B 1.3 DK." In In pursuit of "Wissenschaft". Festschrift für William M. Calder III zum 75. Geburtstag, edited by Heilen, Stephan [et al.], 299-301. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Jaap Mansfeld proposes to read διὰ παντός in the fragment 1.3 DK instead of πάντ' ἄστη.
———. 2015. "Parmenides from Right to Left." Études platoniciennes no. 12:1-14.

Reprinted in J. Mansfeld, Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 185-202.

Abstract: "Parmenides devotes considerable attention to human physiology in an entirely original way, by appealing to the behaviour and effects of his two physical elements when explaining subjects such as sex differentiation in the womb, aspects of heredity, and sleep and old age. Unlike his general cosmology and account of the origin of mankind, this topos, or part of philosophy, is not anticipated in his Presocratic predecessors. What follows is that the second part of the Poem, whatever its relation to the first part may be believed to be, is meant as a serious account of the world and man from a physicist point of view."

"The first to place the relation between the two parts of the Poem explicitly on the agenda was Aristotle, who says that Parmenides on the one hand placed himself beyond physics by postulating that there is only one immobile Being — but that, on the other hand,

constrained to follow the phenomena, he introduced two physical elements, the hot and the cold or fire and earth in order to construct the world, and in this way designed a theory of nature. A remarkable divergence, but not, it appears, a fatal one. Aristotle even provides a link between the two parts of the Poem by adding that Parmenides classified the hot as Being and the cold as non-Being.(4) That this particular link is most unlikely matters much less than that he endeavoured to find one.

(...)

In the present paper I shall be concerned with a substantial part of the history of this reception, and use it to try and draw some conclusions. Though for the sake of simplicity the evidence will not always actually be discussed from right to left, a fair amount of

backshadowing underlies most of the following inquiry." (pp. 1-2)

(4) Arist. Met. Α.5 986b14–987a2 (= 28A24, in part). Cf. Phys. 1.2 184b26–185a1.
———. 2019. "Parmenides on sense perception in Theophrastus and elsewhere." In ὁδοὶ νοῆσαι. Ways to Think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero, edited by Pulpito, Massimo and Spangenberg, Pilar, 177-191. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia.

Reprinted in J. Mansfeld, Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 203-217.

Abstract: "Theophrastus' account at De sensibus 3–4 shows (1) that he did not find evidence for a detailed theory of sense perception in Parmenides and (2) that he did not include our fr. 28B7 in his overview. The tradition followed by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius concluded from 28B7 that Parmenides rejected the evidence of the senses in favour of that of reason (logos). But logos in Parmenides means 'argument', and glôssa is not the organ of taste but of speech. If Theophrastus had interpreted the evidence of 28B7 in the manner of Sextus and Diogenes he would have been obliged to discuss Parmenides’ triad of purported senses between Plato’s two and Empedocles' five."
———. 2021. "An Early Greek Epic: Narrative Structures in Parmenides’ Poem and the Relation between Its Main Parts." Mnemosyne no. 74:200-237.

Abstract: "The question (once again) is in what cognitively acceptable way the Alētheia and Doxa sections of the epic should be connected, that is to say in what way Parmenides himself may have envisaged the relation between ontological Truth and mistaken

human Opinions. An important distinction is found to obtain between the common run of humankind, ignorant and helpless, and an enlightened human elite. The views of this elite serve as an intermediate between the cognitive condition of humanity in general and the arcane knowledge and ontology of the Alētheia section and help to attenuate the dualism by bridging the gap between ignorance and absolute Truth.

There is a significant and crucial interplay between the two sections which works both ways, forward from the Alētheia to the Doxa section and backwards from the Doxa to the Alētheia section. Defining characteristics of the elements per se and of their

compounds in the Doxa section are reflections of defining properties of Being in the Alētheia section. Conversely, recognition of these elemental characteristics may point the way back to properties of Being. The argument of the epic from fr. B1 to fr. B19

DK is strictly organized by means of reiterated theses and type-scenes, which lend an overarching unity to the poem. This technique itself is not new, but the contents of these reiterated motifs (such as the mention of humans, of the distinction between Being and not-Being, of name-giving, or of defining properties and characteristics) are original. The reiterated motifs which secure the proofs of the main thesis function as hidden persuaders. The story of the extraordinary journey of the anonymous author to the dwelling of his nameless goddess and the revelation he receives from her have been carefully authenticated and stage-managed to provide divine backing for the stunning doctrines put forward and are also aimed at convincing the audience."
Marcacci, Flavia. 2020. "Argumentation and counterfactual reasoning in Parmenides and Melissus." Archai. Revista de Estudos sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental no. 30:1-30.

Abstract: "Parmenides and Melissus employ different deductive styles for their different kinds of argumentation. The former’s poem flows in an interesting sequence of passages: contents foreword, methodological premises, krisis, conclusions and corollaries. The latter, however, organizes an extensive process of deduction to show the characteristics of what is. In both cases, the strength of their argument rests on their deductive form, on the syntactical level of their texts: the formal structure of their reasonings help to identify the features and logical intersections of their thoughts. On the one hand, Parmenides uses modal reasoning, enforcing the employment of the principle of the excluded middle. On the other hand, Melissus radicalizes the use of modal reasoning and employs counterfactual statements in order to develop his doctrine of what is. Despite their differences, both deserve a place in the Stone Age of logic and theory of argumentation due to their common ambition to demonstrate what is."
Marsico, Claudia. 2022. "From Filiar Love to the Parricide. Parmenides among the Socratics." In Supplementa Eleatica Vol. 3: Le vie dell'essere. Studi sulla ricezione antica di Parmenide, edited by Volpe, Enrico, 131-150. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

"As in a cascade effect, if the views about Parmenides change, it also changes what is to be considered Eleatic. Hence, the understanding of the horizon of ideas that impact the classica! period becomes more complex. lt is necessary to establish which were Parmenides' ideas and what were their links with Eleatism, which were the changes introduced in the Athenian environment, and what kind of impact they produced on the Socratic realm, considering that ltaly occupies a vital position in the history and the thought of the group members with Parmenides as the central figure. In this framework, we will highlight relevant aspects of a program oriented to connect Eleatic and Socratic studies by outlining three cases strongly related to re-readings of Parmenides' philosophy, focusing on his authorship of a metaphysical exercise oriented to offer an experience of certainty and truth." (p. 132)
Martin, Stuart B. 2016. Parmenides’ Vision: A Study of Parmenides’ Poem. Lanham: University Press of America.

"Sifting through the various interpretations of Parmenides’ poem from ancient times to the present-day, one might easily get the impression that there were two philosophers who went by the name “Parmenides.” The first and much the older “Parmenides” was a religious seer warning about the danger of settling for a superficial reading of human experience. His visionary poem proclaims that Reality, although it may appear multiple, is as the mystics disclose, an all-comprehending One.1 This Parmenides is credited with insights into the nature and meaning of the universe beyond that which reason alone can discover. This view of Parmenides might well be called, the “religious-mystical” view. However, for many if not most 20th century Western scholars, Parmenides was a protomodern philosopher weighing in against the naive religiosity of his time with a series of brilliant but flawed arguments which perhaps led him to conclude that being is one, but whose method in later, more skillful hands, has come to underpin the scientific (and naturalistic) outlook of the modern world. In short, many modern philosophers relying primarily on analytical procedures would claim Parmenides for themselves. Their interpretation of Parmenides, for want of a better name, could be called the “rationalist” view. The “religious-mystical” interpretation is firmly grounded in the belief that Parmenides’ poem is precisely what it presents itself to be in its opening verses: a vision in which God appears to Parmenides and proclaims to him the way to that one-whole Truth which lies hidden behind the veil of appearances. However, the modern student of philosophy may never encounter any serious consideration of this view, for the pervasive opinion of modern specialists, usually followed uncritically by the textbook expositors, is that Parmenides is first and foremost a rationalist, and the opening scenario is merely a literary device." (p. 1)
Mason, Richard. 1988. "Parmenides and Language." Ancient Philosophy no. 8:149-166.

Abstract: "Parmenides says very little about language. Yet what he says is important, both in the interpretation of his philosophy and more widely. This paper will aim to fit together a coherent understanding and to explain why his views have a wider interest. Four themes will be considered: the nature and extent of his critique of the use of language by mortals; his alleged position as a primordial philosopher of reference; the status of the utterances he puts into the mouth of his Goddess; and his apparent identification of speaking with existing or being."
Matson, Wallace I. 1980. "Parmenides unbound." Philosophical Inquiry no. 2:345-360.

Abstract: "One may doubt whether any two scholars interpret Parmenides in exactly the same way. Nevertheless on one fundamental point they divide naturally and sharply into two camps, which I shall call the Majority and the Minority.

The Majority hold that Parmenides intended the Aletheia part of his poem to be taken as expounding the absolute truth about το εόν, in complete contrast to the Doxa part which presents an altogether untrue account of things that have no real existence. According to the Minority view, on the other hand, the Doxa was put forward as possessing some kind or degree of cognitive validity.

In this paper I shall argue in advocacy of the Minority position."
Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 28:113-135.

Abstract: "This is an essay about the ontological presuppositions of a certain use of 'is' in Greek philosophy - I shall describe it in the first part and present a hypothesis about its semantics in the second. I believe that my study has more than esoteric interest. First, it provides an alternative semantic account of what Charles Kahn has called the 'is' of truth, thereby shedding light on a number of issues in Greek ontology, including an Eleatic paradox of change and Aristotle's response to it. Second, it finds in the semantics of Greek a basis for admitting what have been called 'non-substantial individuals' or 'immanent characters' into accounts of Greek ontology. Third, it yields an interpretation of Aristotle's talk of 'unities' which is crucial to his treatment of substance in the central books of the Metaphysics."
———. 1986. "A Note on Parmenides' Denial of Past and Future." Dialogue no. 25:553-557.

"In a recent issue of Dialogue, Leo Groarke attempts to defend the claim that Parmenides was committed to an atemporal reality.(*)

He argues like this:

(1) In the Parmenidean dictum "[It] is and cannot not be" (B2.4), "is" means "exists", and is in the present tense (536).

(2) (According to Parmenides) there is nothing that fails to exist (536).

(3) It follows from (1) and (2) that "the past is not" and "the future is not" (537).

(4) If the past and future are not, then the present is not. "All three tenses go down the drain together" (538), and so reality is atemporal." (p. 553)

"The point that I have tried to make in this short discussion note is that one cannot be careless about the ontology that one attributes to Parmenides in order to make his ban on non-existence yield other results such as the ban on change, or the abolition of time. Groarke is not the only person to have done this: there are others who have thought that an ontology of facts is adequate to explaining Parmenides' denial of change.(6) Groarke, however, is in special trouble because his account demands, and does not just permit, facts." (p. 557)

(6) For example, Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology", in Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, ed., The Pre-Socratics (New York: Anchor Press, 1974), 260.

(*) Leo Groarke, "Parmenides' Timeless Universe", Dialogue 24/3 (Autumn 1985), 535-541.
McKim, Richard. 2019. "Parmenides: The Road to Reality: A New Verse Translation." Arion: A Journal of the Humanities and the Classics no. 27:105-118.

"Parmenides has not, however, been well served by his English translators. He wrote poetry and yet is almost alwaystranslated into prose. His poem describes a divinely inspired revelation and yet is persistently translated as if it were an exercise in deductive logic. His Greek can be strange and difficult but is never unintelligible, which is more than can be said for the Anglo-gibberish his translators too often force him to speak. Too many subscribe to the misguided notion that a “literal” translation, as close as possible to word-forword, best represents the original. In fact, the painful English that results, so far from being faithful to the Greek, actually betrays it, creating the obscurities it purports to reflect. Parmenides’ reputation for being hard to understand is largely

his translators’ fault, not his.

I’ve undertaken to make amends by translating his poem as a poem, in a loose English approximation of the same meter. My goal is to capture some of what gets lost in prose—to mirror, however dimly, the vital role of poetic form in shaping Parmenides’ vision. The demands of meter make literal translation impossible—not at all a bad thing— while paradoxically freeing the translator to be more faithful. I’ve tried to use this freedom to demonstrate that Parmenides is not the obscurantist would-be logician of so many other translations but a philosopher who thinks in poetry, and whose thought is as clear and accessible as it is astonishing." (pp. 105-106)

(...)

"My translation consists of all the major fragments of part one, which I’ve retitled “The Road to Reality” and which, with a bit of arranging, can be read as a continuous text that’s pretty much complete." (p. 108)
Mckirahan, Richard. 2005. "Assertion and argument in Empedocles’ cosmology or, what did Empedocles learn from Parmenides?" In The Empedoclean Κόσμος: Structure, process and the question of cyclicity: Proceedings of the Symposium Philosophiae Antiquae Tertium Myconense July 6th-July 13th, 2003. Vol.1: Papers, 163-188. Patras: Institute for Philosophical Research.
———. 2008. "Signs and Arguments in Parmenides B8." In The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, edited by Curd, Patricia and Graham, Daniel W., 189-229. New York: Oxford University Press.

"David Sedley recently complained (1) that despite the enormous amount of work on Parmenides in the past generation, the details of Parmenides' arguments have received insufficient attention. (2) It is universally recognized that Parmenides' introduction of argument into philosophy was a move of paramount importance. It is also recognized that the arguments of fragment B8 are closely related. At the beginning of B8, Parmenides asserts that what-is (3) has several attributes; he offers a series of proofs that what-is indeed has those attributes. Some (4) hold that the proofs form a deductive chain in which the conclusion of one argument or series of arguments forms a premise of the next. Others (5) hold that the series of inferences is so tightly connected that their conclusions are logically equivalent, a feature supposedly announced in B5: "For me it is the same where I am to begin from: for that is where I will arrive back again." In act, close study of the fragments reveals that neither claim is correct. Here I offer a new translation of B8, lines 2-51, with an analysis of the arguments, their structure, their success, and their importance.(6)

I begin with a caution. Many of Parmenides' arguments are hard to make out: even on the best arrangement of the available sentences and clauses they are incomplete. Since Parmenides lived before canons of deductive inference had been formalized, he may not have thought that there is need to supply what we regard as missing premises. The interpreter's job is not to aim for formal validity, but to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides' train of thought, showing how he might have supposed that the conclusion follows from premises he gives. This is a matter of sensitivity and sympathy as much as of logic, depending on how we understand other arguments of his as well, and requires willingness to give him the benefit of the doubt -- up to a certain point." (p. 189)

(1) Sedley, "Parmenides and Melissus," 113. Sedley's complaint applies to antiquity as well.

(2) Jonathan Barnes is a notable exception to this tendency. I am indebted to his analysis in Presocratic Philosophers, chaps. 9-11.

(3) So far as possible, I translate to eon by "what-is"; I avoid "being." The expression denotes anything that is (see note 18 here).

(4) Notably Kirk & Raven 268

(5) Owen, "Eleatic Questions."

(6) In some places my discussion depends on interpretations of B2, B6, and B7 that are not presented here for want of space. I sketch my justification for controversial views in the notes.

(18) Parmenides argues here that the second road of investigation, "is not," cannot be pursued, on the grounds that you cannot succeed in knowing or declaring what-is-not. The minimal complete thought characteristic of the first road is eon (or to eon) estin ("what-is is"), with "what-is" being a blank subject with no definite reference: anything that is, whatever it may turn out to be and however it may be appropriate to describe it or refer to it. Likewise for the second road: the blank subject of ouk estin ("is not") is to me eon (or mé eon) ("what-is-not"), and the minimal complete thought characteristic of the second road is to me eon ouk estin ("what-is-not is not"). The argument is not a refutation of "is not" as such. Nor is it a refutation of "what-is-not is not" in the sense of proving that that claim or thought is false. Instead Parmenides undermines "what-is-not is not" as a possible claim or thought. Since what-is-not cannot be known or declared, then a fortiori no claim about what-is-not can be known or declared (for instance, that it is not). Therefore, not even the theoretically minimum thought or assertion about the second road is coherent; no one can manage to think (much less know) it or declare it. On Owen's view ("Eleatic Questions"), the second road is eliminated not at 2.7-8 but at 6.1-2, which establishes the subject of "is" to be not the blank subject I am proposing but whatever can be spoken and thought of. In my view, the second part of 6.1 (esti gar einai: "for it is the case that it is," which Owen translates "for it is possible for it to be") repeats the content of the first road (2.3), while the first part of 6.2 (meden d' ouk estin: "but nothing is not," which Owen translates "but it is not possible for nothing to be") repeats the content of the second road (2.5). with the appropriate "minimal" subjects supplied. Given these premises, it follows that it is false (and therefore not right) to think that what-is-not is or that what-is is not, but true (right) to do what the first part of line 6.1 says: "it is right both to say and to think that it [namely, the subject of "is"I is what-is." The importance of 6.1-2 thus consists in the introduction of minimal subjects for "is" and "is not" together with the associated truisms that what-is is and what-is-not (namely, nothing) is not. This prepares the way for the discussion of the first road in B8, exploring the nature of what-is. (p. 222)
———. 2010. "Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford's Fragment." Ancient Philosophy no. 30:1-14.

"Having established the attributes of τό έον in a series of arguments that end at B8.33, in the following eight lines Parmenides goes on to explore implications of his earlier claim that 'you cannot know what is not ... nor can you declare it' (B2.7-8) in the light of the results obtained so far in B8.

(...)

One of the principal issues in dispute is the relation between a line quoted in two ancient sources (Plato's Theaetetus and a commentary on that work by an unknown author) and B8.38. Do those sources contain the true version of B8.38, an incorrect version of that line -- a misquotation of the true version, or an allogether different line? B8.38 is a pivotal line in the passage B8.34-41; as indicated above, I believe that it contains the end of the first part of the passage and the beginning of the second, although it is commonly understood differently." (p. 1)
Meijer, Pieter Ane. 1997. Parmenides Beyond the Gates: the Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and the Doxa. Amsterdam: Gieben.

Contents: Part I: Being and Thinking; Chapter I. The relation of Being and Thinking 3; Chapter II. Being and temporality 15; Chapter III. Being and spatiality 29; Chapter IV. Being and Matter 44; Chapter V. Tensions of a spatial and material Being and of Thinking within the identity of Being and Thinking 47; Chapter IV. Fragment 4 of the identity of Being and Thinking 54; Appendix: Parmenides and the previous history of the concept of Being 85; Part II. Being and Logic; Chapter I. The logical circle:98; Chapter II. The subject of estin 114; Chapter III. The logical procedure again 123; Part III. Doxa and Mortals; Chapter I. Ways and 'Doxa? 144; Chapter II. Scholarly views of the 'Doxa' 166; Chapter III. The basic error of fr. 8, 53,54 190; Chapter IV. Negative qualifications of the Doxa 208; Chapter V. A plea for the existence of the Doxa 217; Part IV. A panoramic survey of results 234; Bibliography 252-257; Indices 258-274.

"Crucial will also be the discussion of the ways of inquiry Parmenides offers. Their detailed examination and delineation will appear to be of vital importance for the understanding of both Being and the Doxa. Anticipating my results, I would like to present as my view that die Doxa is not at all a way of inquiry, but that it must be seen as an optimalized description of Parmenides’ view on this world. It embeds many theorems of predecessors to give an accomplished, overall and insuperable picture of this world, which is radically separated from "the world” of Being.

In Part I of this book the problems which arise from the identification of Being and thinking are examined. In Part II it is the issue of the relation of logic and Being that comes to the fore. In Part III I attempt to catalogue and assess the scholarly explanations given of the Doxa sofar in order to clarify the problems and arrive at a view of my own. Many publications in this field are lacking in confrontation with other already existing opinions. In presenting my own views I confront the views of other scholars. Therefore, a panoramic survey of my results may facilitate the reading of this book. This is the reason why I added Part IV to provide a summary of my views and conclusions." (Preface, P. XV)
Miller, Ed. 1968. "Parmenides the prophet?" Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 6:67-69.

"The latest word on Parmenides comes from a recent and exhaustive study by Leonardo Tarán. (1) Among other illuminating and novel interpretations, Tarán argues that Parmenides was not, after all, guilty of the confusion between the existential and copulative senses of " to be," that he did not identify thinking with Being, and that he had no conception of atemporal reality.(2) In these and other respects Tarán's volume makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of Parmenides. One might judge, however, that Tarán work is unusually insensitive to the religious element in Parmenides' poem, and in this respect his analysis seems to echo Reinhardt's unfortunate judgment which calls Parmenides "einen Denker, der keinen Wunsch kennt als Erkenntnis, keine Fessel fühlt als Logik, den Gott und Gefhül gleichgültig lassen." (3) This inadequacy of Tarán's approach to Parmenides is evident in his treatment of the poem in general, and especially the prologue." (p. 67)

(1) Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays (Princeton, 1965).

(2) See my review of this work in The Classical Journal, LXII (1967), 232ff.

(3) Parmenides und die Geschiehtc der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn, 1916), p. 256.
Miller, Fred Dycus. 1977. "Parmenides on Mortal Belief." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 15:253-265.

"I shall argue here that we, also, ought to accept Plato's judgment as to the philosophical merit of Parmenides' work. At the core of Parmenides' logic, I believe, we find neither a crude equivocation on the Greek word " to be" nor a crude confusion between meaning and reference or between meaning and truth, nor a bundle of modal fallacies. What we do discover is an important insight concerning the nature of thought and discourse, expressed in such a subtly (but disastrously) confused way that the valuable was not completely disentangled from the nonsensical until Plato wrote the Sophist.

The repudiation of the beliefs of mortals at the outset of "The Way of Seeming" is founded upon the "strife-encompassed proof" which is developed in "The Way of Truth." I will endeavor to clarify his reasoning, considering Parmenides' attack on naming and the repudiation of mortals' beliefs (Section I) and later his principle or dictum that "you cannot think or say what is not" (Section lII). In trying to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Parmenides' reasoning, I will also make use of two arguments that were intentionally directed against Eleatic teachings: Leucippus's defense of the void (Section II) and Plato's defense of falsity (Section IV)." (p. 253)
Miller, Mitchell H. 1979. "Parmenides and the Disclosure of Being." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 13:12-35.

"The aim of this discussion is to offer an interpretation of the sense and intent of Parmenides' ἔστι. As the plethora and variety of excellent analysis attests, the problem is a perplexing one. The interpreter is faced with an intentionally fragmentary utterance - the ἔστι appears to stand alone, with its subject (and, possibly, predicate) ellipted - embedded in a collection of fragments from a lost whole poem which, in turn, is itself one of the few pieces of philosophical writing to survive from the sixth century B.C. I will argue in this essay, nonetheless, that the original context of the ton can be recovered and that, once this context is established, its sense can be fixed.

The key to my interpretation is a close reading of the proem. As it is, this passage is generally ignored in analyses of the argumentative substance of the poem." (p. 12)

"If this interpretation is correct, then Parmenides did not regard the contraries as mere illusion. 53 It is true that he does not provide any explicit ontological characterization of their secondary status or domain. That will be the work of Plato and Aristotle.

Nonetheless, in their accounts they are not overcoming a one-sided monism but, rather, completing a task for which Parmenides has established the starting-point and direction." (p. 28, note omitted)
———. 2006. "Ambiguity and Transport: Reflections on the Proem to Parmenides' Poem." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 30:1-47.

"Let me begin by distinguishing an ultimate and a proximate task for these reflections. The ultimate task, a perennial one for students of Greek philosophy, is to understand just what Parmenides lays open for thinking and speaking when, in the so-called Truth section of his poem, fragments 2 through 8. 49, he isolates the ‘is’ (έστι) that is ‘the steadfast heart of . . . truth’ (1. 29). The proximate task is to explore the context Parmenides gives us for this ultimate task, the proem’s account of the transformative journey to and through ‘the gates of the paths of Night and Day’ that brings the traveller into the presence of the truth-speaking goddess.' We modern-day philosophers have generally been reluctant to pursue this exploration too closely, not only because we are accustomed to draw a sharp distinction between poetry and philosophy, a distinction that, arguably, did not take hold in the Greek world until Aristotle, but also, more to the point at present, because Parmenides’ proem seems riddled with ambiguity. This is not wrong; indeed, as I shall try to show, its ambiguity is both more extensive and more central than has been recognized heretofore. But I shall also try to show that it is a resource, not a liability; by the close of these reflections I hope to have made compelling that and why bringing the ambiguity of the proem into good focus is key to a well-oriented turn to our ultimate task, understanding the ‘is’." (p. 1)
Minar Jr, Edwin L. 1949. "Parmenides and the World of Seeming." American Journal of Philology no. 70:41-55.

"In summary, the legislative activity of Parmenides and his association with the politically-minded Pythagoreans show him to be capable of taking interest in practical affairs. The very fact of his writing a didactic poem, the rhetorical warmth of its style, the elaboration of the second part as a socially valuable doctrine, all show that his philosophy is not alien to this interest.

And the appropriateness of his intellectual position to his position in life and the correlation of his views with those of other thinkers, opposing and agreeing, which are sometimes expressed in social terms, make it seem not unlikely that he was influenced in their formation by his reaction to the problems of the " world of seeming."

In so far as he had an immediate aim of conviction and conversion, it is questionable how successful he can have been in it.

Certainly he attracted a number of brilliant and devoted disciples, but it was naive to expect many to follow the severe, logical development of his thoughts, and a type of theory which almost everyone must regard as absurd-or to expect many to be influenced strongly by a system frankly presented as truly false and only second-best. Yet his greatness, as was said at the outset, is as a thinker, not as a statesman, and his important influence was not upon his contemporaries but upon later philosophers." (p. 55)
Mitchell, Morse J. 1991. "Parmenides as parody." Hellas: a Journal of Poetry and the Humanities no. 2:11-32.
Mogyoródi, Emese. 2006. "Xenophanes' Epistemology and Parmenides' Quest for Knowledge." In La costruzione del discorso filosofico nell'età dei Presocratici = The construction of philosophical discourse in the age of the Presocratics, edited by Sassi, Maria Michela, 123-160. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale.

Abstract: "The purpose of this essay is to explore the role Xenophanes' theory of knowledge might have played in the formation of Parmenides' central metaphysical concerns. It provides a detailed study of Xenophanes' epistemic tenets clarified within the context of his theology and cosmology. It argues that although Xenophanes' epistemic ideas were formulated within the intellectual historical context of traditional 'poetic pessimism', an examination of his theology and cosmology indicates that inasmuch as he radically departed from the traditional notion of the divine and the divine-human relationship, his epistemology created an ambiguous epistemic setting chat proved provoking for the new paradigm of knowledge philosophical speculation introduced in early Greece. Parmenides responded to this crisis by a metaphysical inquiry into the rationale of 'the quest' and the nature of reality in a way by which he brought about a fundamental breakthrough toward a new methodology to attain scientific certainty.

Since Xenophanes' epistemology was essentially related to his theology, Parmenides' response necessarily entailed a new conception of the divine-human relationship."
———. 2020. "Materialism and Immaterialism, Compatibility and Incompatibility in Parmenides." Anais de Filosofia Clássica no. 28:81-106.

Abstract: "The article provides a critical assessment of the viability of a materialist interpretation of Parmenides’ ontology, discussing it in the context of the notorious issue of the compatibility of what-is in Alētheia and the cosmic constituents (light and night) in Doxa. It makes a case for a strictly incompatibilist view and, on this basis, concludes that a materialist interpretation of what-is is wanting. Clarifying Parmenides’ own notion of the material, it makes the proposal that, whereas the mind vs. body/matter

contradistinction was not available for Parmenides, he did distinguish between the natural and the supernatural. Finally, it suggests that a special kind of duality reminiscent of the contradistinction could have featured in his philosophy, which might have influenced Plato."
———. 2024. "Light, Knowledge, Incorporeality, and the Feminine in Parmenides." In Soul, Body, and Gender in Late Antiquity: Essays on Embodiment and Disembodiment, edited by Panayotov, Stanimir, Jugănaru, Andra, Theologou, Anastasia and Perczel, István, 33-56. New York: Routledge.

"The bulk of the volume consists of five thematic and disciplinary sections. The first one, “Gender and the Self in Greek Philosophy,” begins with five studies dealing mostly with late antique philosophy and problems of gender and femininity. Here, the opening text by Emese Mogyoródi (University of Szeged) sets the stage, with some important consequences, for some of the next chapters and for scholarship dealing with the long legacy of both Parmenides and Plato’s eponymous dialogue. Parmenides’ usual modern interpretations acclaim him as a paragon of reason and hence as a pioneer in the foundations of Western science, as we conceive of it today. While this account is not fundamentally flawed, some crucial features of Parmenides’ poem suggest that it might be misleading to present it as a paragon of “logic” of a masculinist type. The poetic ego of the poem is a young man (kouros) who, after a mythical journey on a chariot to the heavens, encounters an anonymous goddess who initiates him into some profound knowledge about both “Truth” and “Appearance.” Further striking details of the poem suggest that Parmenides might have put a great premium on the fact that the knowledge conveyed by his poem is presented as revealed by a female figure, and the poem is thronged with traditional goddesses or female powers, persistently featuring in all three sections (Proem, Alētheia, Doxa), which suggest that they play some explanatory role both in the arguments (Peithō) and the metaphysical (Alētheia) and natural philosophical (Doxa) conclusions. Hence, the question is raised from substantially revised premises: what is the role of the feminine in Parmenides’ poem and philosophy? This chapter also analyzes the role and the symbolism of light and night, connects

them with the poem’s metaphysical and natural philosophical theses and argues that, in contrast to traditional Greek notions, as well as to mainstream modern accounts on the poem, Parmenides not only associated positive qualities with the feminine, but also accorded to it an ontological and cosmological status that is higher than that of the male gender" (pp. 5-6)
Møller, Vigdis Songe. 2002. Philosophy Without Women: The Birth of Sexism in Western Thought. London: Continuum.

Chapter 2: Thought and Sexuality: A Troubled Relationship. An analysis of Hesiod and Parmenides, pp. 21-48; Chapter 3: The Logic of Exclusion and the Free Men's Democracy. An analysis of the notions of equality and balance in Anaximander and Parmenides, pp. 49-75.

"The central philosophers in this book are Parmenides and Plato. It is in the works of these two thinkers that the ideals of unity, identity and unchangeability are developed with the greatest clarity. These ideals can however be traced back to the poet Hesiod, who serves as the starting point of my study.

In Hesiod's texts, these ideals and their opposites are related to sexual difference; whereas unity, identity and unchangeability tend to be symbols of the man and the masculine, plurality and death are seen as representing the woman and femininity. Parmenides and Plato significantly augment this picture: since the unity of existence can only be grasped by means of thought, this too becomes associated with the man and the masculine. This view is unambiguously developed in Plato's Symposium, to which one of my chapters is devoted. In that dialogue, Plato depicts the philosopher as a man whose love of ideas allows him to aspire to a higher form of reality than that attained by the woman in giving birth. By means of his thought the philosopher immortalizes himself, thereby gaining independence of women and indeed heterosexuality in any form. Masculine spiritual love and creativity is contrasted here with female sexuality and the process of giving birth." (Introduction, p. XIV)

"To prepare the ground for what will be a fairly detailed analysis of Parmenides' work, I shall begin by taking a close look at the Theogony. It will become clear that Hesiod's genealogical account of reality runs into serious theoretical difficulties, something which Parmenides takes into account in his own work. Parmenides' concern is to find an alternative to the genealogical perspective. He attempts to grasp the peculiarity of existence without reference to the question of origins. But his intense refutation of everything connected with birth and becoming also results in a rejection of the female and the postulation of an ideal of existence correspondingly remote from sexuality, a type of existence which is in many ways purely masculine; only once we get beyond sexuality can we glimpse immortality. I am aware that it is unusual to attribute such thoughts to Parmenides, who has often been called 'the father of logic'. But in emphasizing the Hesiodic tradition to which he so obviously belongs, I hope to throw this aspect of his thought into clear relief and thereby expose his philosophy in an unfamiliar shape.(4)" (pp. 22-23)

(4) The account of Parmenides' philosophy offered here differs significantly from prevailing interpretations on a number of points. Firstly, the research tradition has not been commonly concerned with the issue of gender and sexuality in relation to Parmenides. It is only in the course of the last ten years that such themes have received any attention whatsoever, and evidently they still belong on the fringe of Parmenidean research, to put it mildly.(...)
Morgan, Kathryn. 2000. Myth and Philosophy from Presocratics to Plato. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

On Parmenides see pp. 67-86.

"A study of the fragments of Parmenides' philosophical poem concerning the possible types of human enquiry provides an opportunity for an in-depth analysis of one suggestive use of myth in Presocratic philosophy. We have argued that Xenophanes defined his philosophical aspirations by excluding poetic/mythological practice. Herakleitos appropriated and transformed mythological elements in order to draw attention to the failings of traditional myth as an adequate system of signification. Both philosophers are concerned with the problematic relationship of language and reality. Yet in both cases poetry and mythology, although important, even crucial targets, are not structuring principles in their philosophy. When one moves to the fragments of Parmenides, one is in a different world. Although Parmenides' mythology is non-traditional, his search for knowledge is communicated to the reader through familiar motifs of quest and revelation and is attended by divine mythological beings. His wisdom is expressed in epic hexameters, which, although commonly stigmatised as clumsy and pedestrian, transport us back to the poetic and mythological realm of Homer and Hesiod. (1) What on earth was Parmenides about?

In this section, I shall characterise the ways in which Parmenides chooses to talk about his insight into the problems of being. Treatments of Parmenides sometimes imply that the mythological framework of the poem is a veneer that can be stripped away to reveal pure philosophical argument. On the contrary, mythological elements are integrated into the argument, and interpreting their status is one of the crucial philosophical problems in the poem. Separating Parmenides' mythos from logos he speaks the same tendency we saw in the interpretation of Xenophanes' literary ethics and theology: the desire to tidy up philosophy (separate mythos from logos) so that it conforms to modern perceptions of its subject matter and method. The idea that literary presentation might have philosophical import is ignored. There is, however, no dichotomy between logic on the one hand, and metaphor and myth on the other. This is to argue in terms which would have been foreign to Parmenides. Problems of mythological style and philosophical content are not only parallel, they are expressions of the same difficulty, the relationship between thought and its expression. Here Parmenides follows in the footsteps of his predecessors as he focuses on the problems of myth as a way of symbolising the difficulties inherent in all language.

Parmenides wishes to make his audience aware of the non-referentiality of what-is-not. He does this through logical argument and by developing mythological figures of presentation that transgress the conclusions of his argument. Both argument and literary presentation problematise the status of the audience; there is a paradoxical incoherence between the world in which we live and the uniqueness and homogeneity of what-is. These difficulties are mirrored in the uncertain relationship of the narrator of the poem (the kouros), Parmenides the author, and the goddess who reveals the truth. The goddess replaces the Muse, but the source of inspiration is uncertain. Let us first survey the main features of the revelation, emphasising the dose connection between thought and being, along with the key themes of narrative persuasion and conviction. We will then engage in a dose reading of the mythological framework of the proem to show how it structures and elaborates the key themes of the rest of the poem. Finally we shall consider the poem as a series of nested fictions that draw attention to problems in the relationship of language and reality, problems of which the mythological framework is paradigmatic." (pp. 67-68)

(1) Parmenides may also have included Orphic elements, which would again contribute to a sense of comfortable orientation in a tradition (Mourelatos 1970: 42). For a recent, but unconvincing, attempt to find Orphism in Parmenides, see Böhme 1986.
———. 2022. "Parmenides and the Language of Constraint." In Hesiod and the Beginnings of Greek Philosophy, edited by Iribarren, Leopoldo and Koning, Hugo, 221-238. Leiden: Brill.

"I shall suggest that Parmenides’ language of constraint is appropriated from the Theogony, and that the triumphalism of Parmenides’ establishment of the logical primacy of Being has its roots in the victory of the Olympian gods over the Titans and their

imprisonment in Tartarus. I shall start by outlining the topographical similarities between Hesiod’s underworld and the locale of the revelation narrated in Parmenides’ proem, and then pause to reflect on the interpretative constraints placed (or not placed) on our analysis by these similarities. The analysis will then focus specifically on the language of imprisonment shared by Hesiod and Parmenides, as well as the motif of returning to the light, arguing that it is necessary to move beyond interpretative strategies based on imposing Hesiodic topography on Parmenides. We shall see that Parmenides gives the language of binding a paradoxically positive significance, creatively transforming this Hesiodic motif." (pp. 221-222)
Morrison, J.S. 1955. "Parmenides and Er." Journal of Hellenic Studies no. 75:59-68.

Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to explore the suggestion that Parmenides's poem, or at any rate some of it, has light to throw on the difficulties of the myth of Er in the Republic. Parmenides descends to the underworld as a shaman-poet in search of knowledge, Er goes there by the fortuitous circumstance of his death-like trance; but both katabaseis share a common setting, and in both the hero is shown a glimpse of the real shape and mechanism of the universe. In the case of Parmenides the exhibit is two-fold, both 'the unshakeable heart of rounded truth' and 'the opinions of men in which there is no true belief'. Interest has been mainly concentrated on the former, metaphysical, section, from which the greater part of our fragments derive; but the latter contained, in the system of stephanai (*), an account of the appearance of the universe, which is interesting, both on its own account and in view of the light it throws on the difficulties of Er's myth. I shall consider first (I) the setting of Parmenides's poem as it appears in the opening lines, then (II) propose an interpretation of the system of stephanai, and (III) seek support for some of its main features in the general tradition of cosmological speculation from Homer downwards. Finally (IV), I shall proceed to examine the myth of Er and offer an interpretation of some of its difficulties which will take account of this body of earlier thought."

[(*) "Parmenides, on the other hand, in fact [proposes] a fabrication. He makes up something like a wreath—he calls it a stephanē-—a continuous blazing circle of light which encircles the heaven, and he calls it god." Cicero On the Nature of the Gods i, 11, 28 (Dox. 534, 14–535, 8) cited by A. H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides, Revised and Expanded Edition, Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing 2009, Testimonia 54, p. 144.]
Mosimann, Robert. 2001. "Parmenides. An Ontological Interpretation." Philosophical Inquiry no. 23:87-101.

"Presocratic scholarship is a rare phenomenon and even when it occurs, often commences from misguided tenets. Anglo-American philosophy has been much preoccupied by linguistic analysis and logical concerns. Regretfully these concerns of the day have been foisted upon Parmcnides as if he too were a shadow of today's illusions in philosophy.

This paper has several objectives, however, the principal one will be to provide an Ontological interpretation of Parmenides in replacement of the Logical Ones which have come to dominate Anglo American scholarship.

The second concern of this paper will be to correctly interpret "estai" and "that which is" in Parmcnides as well as to determine the existential status of the objects of everyday experience.

Finally, we will discuss Parmenides conception of time and whether "that which is" is atemporal, eternal or neither." (p. 87)
Mosquera Rodas, Jhon Jairo. 2024. "A Different Perspective on the Polemic Between Heraclitus and Parmenides Concerning the Inner World and the Outer World in the Unity." SSRN:1-15.

Abstract: "The research presents the relationship between movement and staticity as an essential polemic presented by the ideas of Heraclitus and Parmenides, naturalist philosophers, in correspondence with the solution presented from the perspective of the macrouniverse and the contributions of Einstein and Rajinder, Singh, for the solution of this.

The paper presents the analysis of motion and staticity as the centre of the essential polemic between the two philosophers, and then makes an in-depth comparison between the most important fragments of Heraclitus and some key aspects of Parmenides' poem of nature, to finally present a complex solution to the polemic using aspects of cosmology and philosophy in permanent relation to unity."
Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. 1965. "Φράζω and Its Derivatives in Parmenides." Classical Philology no. 60:261-262.

"Ever since Villoison's 1788 (*) publication of the Venetus scholia to Homer, classical philologists have been alert to the fact that φράζω may not (and usually does not) carry the meaning dico in early Greek poetry. It has rather a concrete sense, the core or root of which is "to point out," "to show," "to indicate with a gesture," "to appoint," "to instruct."

(...)

I would like to suggest here that the early, concrete sense of φράζω will improve the translation of 2. 6-8 and will also give us the key to the translation of that puzzling adjective πολύφραστοι applied to the horses in 1. 4." (p. 261)

[*] Jean-Baptiste-Gaspard d'Ansse de Villoison, Homeri Ilias ad veteris codicis Veneti fidem recensita. Scholia in eam antiquissima, Venetiis, 1788.
———. 1969. "Comments on 'The thesis of Parmenides'." The Review of Metaphysics no. 22:735-744.

About the paper by Charles Kahn (1969).

"The first of the two routes outlined by the Parmenidean goddess in fr. 2 is given this interpretive formulation in Kahn's paper: "It (whatever we can know, or whatever there is to be known) is a definite fact, an actual state of affairs." (1) Kahn explains that Parmenides intends to assert "not only the reality but the determinate being-so of the knowable object," in other words, that he posits existence both "for the subject entity" and "for the fact or situation which characterizes this entity in a determinate way" (pp. 712-713) .

As indicated by Kahn's use of the pronoun "whatever," the thesis has the force of universality. (2) Let me condense the formulation into a single proposition:

(1) For all p, if p is known, then p is true iff (3) there actually exists a certain F and a certain x such that Fx.

What should count as the denial of (1) P Presumably either:

(2) It is not the case that for all p, etc. [as in (1)];

or, more explicitly,

(3) There is a p such that: p is known, and p is true even though a certain x does not exist, or a certain F does not obtain.

If (1) is an adequate formulation of Parmenides' first route (which according to Kahn it is), then (3) ought to be the correct formulation of the second route. But Kahn's own formulation is significantly different. The first of the two "partial aspects" he distinguishes, the aspect of nonexistence of the subject, he formulates as the claim "that an object for cognition does not exist, that there is no real entity for us to know, describe, or refer to." The second aspect, nonexistence of a certain state of affairs, he expresses as the claim "that there is . . . no fact given as object for knowledge and true statement: whatever we might wish to cognize or describe is simply not the case" (p. 713). Either aspect could be condensed in either of the following formulations:

(4) There is no p such that: p is known, and p is true iff there actually exists a certain F and a certain x such that Fx.

(5) For all p, if p is known, then p is true if a certain x does not exist or a certain F does not obtain.

It should be noticed immediately that (4) and (5) are alternative formulations not of the contradictory of (1) but of its contrary. If anything is clear about the argument in Parmenides' poem, it is that he intends the two routes as exclusive alternatives, the one a contradiction of the other.' Kahn's analysis thus appears to involve an imprecise formulation of the opposition between the two Parmenidean routes."

(1) Charles H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides," pp. 711-712. References to the paper will hereafter be given mostly in the text and by page number only.

(2) The formulation of p. 714 has similar scope: "esti" claims only that something must he the case in the world for there to be any knowledge or any truth." The deflating expressions "only" and "something" should not mislead; the governing universal quantifier is in the pronoun "any."

(3) The usual abbreviation for "if and only if."

(4) But Kahn says (p. 713) that Parmenides' second route "would deny both assertions" (i.e., both the ascription of existence to x and the ascription of actuality to F). The "both" seems to be an over-statement not required by Kahn's interpretation.

(5) Kahn recognizes this (p. 706). The point I am making has nothing to do with the fact. that. the modal clauses in the two routes of fr. 2 are related as contraries. Propositions (1)-(5) are formulations of the nonmodal clauses of the routes.
———. 1970. The Route of Parmenides: a Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments. New Haven: Yale University Press.

New, revised edition including a new introduction, three additional essays and a previously unpublished paper by Gregory Vlastos, Names of Being in Parmenides, Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2008.

Reprint of the pages 222-263 (abridged and slightly revised) wit the title: "The Deceptive Words of Parmenides' 'Doxa' " in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 312-349.

Contents: Returning to Elea: Preface and Afterword to the revised and expanded edition (2008) XI-L; Part I. The route of Parmenides: a study of word, image, and argument in the Fragments: Use of Greek and treatment of philological and specialized topics LIII; Abbreviations used in Part I LVII-LIX; 1. Epic form 1; 2. Cognitive quest and the Route 47; 3. The vagueness of What-is-not 74; 4. Signposts 94; 5. The bound of reality 115; 6. Persuasion and fidelity 136; 7. Mind's commitment to reality 164; 8. Doxa as acceptance 194; 9. Deceptive words 222; Appendix I. Parmenides' hexameter 264; Appendix II. Interpretations of the Subjectless esti 269; Appendix III. The meaning of kré and cognates 277; Appendix IV. Text of the Fragments 279; Supplementary list of works cited in Part I. 285; Part II. Thee supplemental essays; Abbreviations used in Part II 297; 10. Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the naive metaphysics of things 299; 11. Determinacy and indeterminacy, Being and Non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides 333; 12. Some alternatives in interpreting Parmenides 350; Part III. The scope of naming: Gregory Vlastos (1907-1991) on B.38 and related issues (Essay not previously published: "Names" of being in Parmenides, by Gregory Vlastos 367; Indexes to Parts I-III 391-408.

"My own aim has been to steer a middle course, keeping three points in sight: (a) Parmenides' relation to the epic tradition; (b) the deep and central involvement of his thought in the sequence of Greek philosophy from Thales to Plato; (c) the supra-historical dimension of the concepts, problems, and arguments in the poem.

The book is not intended as a commentary on the fragments. For this one must still turn to Hermann Diels' Parmenides' L.ehrgedicht (Berlin, 1897) and to the two more recent commentaries: Mario Untersteiner’s Parmenide: testimonianze e frammenti (Florence, 1958) and Leonardo Taran’s Parmenides: Λ Text with Translation, Commentary and Critical Essays (Princeton, 1965). The most up-to-date, comprehensive account of the various interpretations of individual lines and passages will be found in the Italian revision of Zeller’s history of Greek philosophy: E. Zeller-R. Mondolfo, La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico, Part I, 3, “Eleati,” ed. G. Reale (Florence, 1967), pp. 165-335.

As the subtitle of the present study indicates, I have concentrated on the actual language of the fragments: on analyzing the meaning of key words, on articulating arguments, and on exploring the context and morphology of images in the poem. These three aspects I see as congruent. The study of Parmenides' vocabulary reveals that the key terms are embedded in certain paradigms involving analyzable logical structures. They provide trace lines for the argumentation—the logical grammar of the words channels the course of the argument. A similar point can be made with reference to the second aspect mentioned in the subtitle. The imagery introduced in the narrative prelude (B1) is preserved, to an important extent, through verbal echoes in the rest of the poem. But the images do not function evocatively, to suggest a mood, or to point to a symbolic value. Rather, they come in certain configurations of motifs or themes, familiar from Homer (especially the Odyssey) and from Hesiod. The imagery can thus provide a sort of logical calculus for the argument, as well as paradigms or-models for the radically new concepts of knowledge and reality which Parmenides strives to formulate.

I might best summarize all this in saying that I have tried to do justice to the fact that Parmenides composed a philosophical argument in the form of an epic poem. In accordance with this approach, I have also tried to show in the concluding chapter that the poem’s dramatic setting, rudimentary as it is (an all-knowing goddess in a double relation to “ignorant mortals” and to a privileged youth, who is entrusted with a revelation to be subsequently communicated to his fellow men), interacts in important ways with the rhetoric and the argument of the poem as a whole. (The comparison with Plato is, once again, apposite.)" (from the Preface to the first edition, 1970, pp. XIV-XV)

"In the nearly four decades that have passed since the Yale University Press edition, the volume of literature on Parmenides, both books and essays, has exploded. Accordingly, a thorough and fully updated revision is out of the question. It could only be a total re-writing of the book.

Let me, then, clarify at the outset the scope of "revised and expanded." On its subject, The Route of Parmenides inevitably reflects the status quaestionis of the mid- and late- 1960s. The revisions in the present reissue of the Yale Press book (Part I of this volume) are modest: mostly corrections of misprints; altering or adjusting some misleading formulations; editing some egregiously dated phrases, such as "X has recently argued," or "in this [twentieth] century"; and the like. All this was done with care not to change the arabic-number pagination (except for the Indexes) of the Yale Press edition; for it was my concern not only to keep costs of production low but also to ward off the emergence of inconsistencies in citations of the book in the literature.

(...)

If the revisions are delicate and unobtrusive, the expansion is substantial and obvious. Part II reprints three essays of mine, composed in the mid- and late- 1970s, in which I sought to supplement, to strengthen, and in some respects also to modify theses that were advanced in the original edition of the book (theses that are still represented here in Part I). As in the case of the text in Part I, slight adjustments and corrections have been made for the reprinting of the three essays. But the type-setting and pagination in Part II are, of course, new. Part III consists of a previously unpublished essay by Gregory Vlastos. The rationale of publishing posthumously this essay by Vlastos, as well as that of reprinting my own three previously published essays, is perhaps best given in the course of a narrative, which immediately follows here, of my engagement with the thought of Parmenides over the years. Additional comments and afterthoughts, ones that reflect my present views on crucial points of interpretation, will be presented in the course of the narrative and in the closing sections of this Preface." (from the Preface to the Revised and Expanded Edition, 2008, pp. XI-XIII)
———. 1971. "Mind's Commitment to the Real: Parmenides B8 34-41." In Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, edited by Anton, John P. and Kustas, George L., 59-80. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"An expanded version of this paper appears as chapter 7 of my book, The Route of Parmenides" (p. 59)

"In proposing to undertake here yet another argument on the analysis of the passage, I do not aim for anything like certainty or finality of exegesis. This would be too much to hope for, when we are working at such small scale, and all the more so in the case of pre-Socratic

studies, where the evidence itself is limited and fragmentary and our controls over language and background only too imperfect. Rather it is through an analysis of this passage that I can explain most clearly and directly a certain conception of the relation of mind to reality for which I also find evidence in other texts, in some of the characteristic aspects and themes of Parmenides' poem, and which I consider philosophically and historically important. So let me proceed directly to the analysis, not pausing to review or to formulate the status quaestionis, but taking up points of controversy as they arise." (pp. 59-60)
———. 1973. "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Being." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy:16-48.

Supplementary vol. I: E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (eds.), Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, Assen: Van Gorcum.

Already published as chapter 10 of The Route of Parmenides: a Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments.

"The world we know is not a mere thing or an aggregate of things but a whole that is conceptual!y articulated. It is pervaded by abstract entities, such as qualities, kinds, and relations-entities we can only explain to ourselves indirectly, by saying they are what in the world corresponds to expressions of such-and-such form. Let me refer to this conception by the phrase "the world as logos-textured." The great revolutionary is, of course, Plato; and rhe great moment of the revolution is in the doctrine of the communion of forms in the Sophist, with perhaps an initial, programmatic thrust in this direction already made by the Socrates of Phaedo, who "takes refuge in λόγος." Aristotle feels so much ar home in rhe new logos-textured world that he takes it for granted that his early predecessors, too, must have thought in terms of substance-attribute, quality, privation, and like abstractions.

My purpose in rhis paper is to look into the pre-history of this revolution. Two thinkers, Heraclitus and Parmenides, played decisive, though contrasting roles. I will also try to show what was the genuine and compelling attractiveness of what I shall here call "the naive metaphysics of things." For I do not wish to suggest that Heraclirus and Parmenides sought to correct a parochial, or merely primitive error.

The allure of this naive metaphysics would thus also help explain why for Plato the movement toward the logos-textured world involved so much soul-searching and self-criticism." (The Route of Parmenides, pp. 299-300 of the 2008 edition; two notes omitted)
———. 1975. "Determinacy and indeterminacy as the key contrasts in Parmenides." Lampas no. 8:334-343.
———. 1976. "Determinacy and Indeterminacy, Being and non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides." In New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics, edited by Shiner, Roger and King-Farlow, John, 45-60. Guelph: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy.

"The main argument in Parmenides' didactic poem begins with these remarks by the unnamed goddess who delivers the revelation (B2 in Diels-Kranz Die Fragmente dec Vorsokratiker): [follow a translation of B2-B8, here omitted]

Modern students of Parmenides have agonized over the question as to how precisely we are to construe the first esti and the einai of the positive "route,” and the ouk esti and me einai of the negative "route". The older solution was to attempt to guess the identity of the suppressed subject from the context, and then to supply it in the translation (e.g., "Being exists . . . or “Something exists," or "Truth exists...," or "The route (hodos) exists...," and the like). In more recent years a certain consensus has developed, at least in

English-language literature, that Parmenides' argument depends on suppressing the subject initially; that it is his intention to allow the subject to become gradually specified as one ponders the logic and implications of the two routes. Within that wider consensus, my own argument has been (2) that Parmenides' subjectless esti in B2 is best understood as {syntactically) a bare copula,with both its subject and its predicate complement deliberately suppressed. The route esti would thus represent not a proposition or premise but the mere form or frame of propositions that characterize their subject in positive terms, "___is___" or "x is F" r for variable x and F; the route ouk esti, correspondingly, would represent the form of propositions that characterize their subject in negative terms, "___is not___" or (x is not-F,” for variable x and F.

Of the arguments which, I believe, justify this construction, I shall restate here only those that can be presented most briefly; I shall also present some fresh considerations and additional evidence; and, on certain points, l shall qualify or attempt to elucidate my earlier account." (pp. 46-47 some notes omitted)

(2) The Route of Parmenides (New Haven and London. 1970.1. pp. 51-55. 70. 269-76; "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Meiaphysics of Things"' in Exegeses and Argument, pp, 40-46; "Comments on ‘The Thesis of Parmenides.' " The Review of Metaphysics, 22 (1969>, 742-44.
———. 1979. "Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides." The Monist no. 62:3-14.

"In the work of interpreting Parmenides we have witnessed in the 'sixties and 'seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus. Four interpretive theses now seem quite widely shared: (a) Parmenides deliberately suppresses the subject of esti, "is," or einai, "to be," in his statement of the two "routes" in B2, his intention being to allow the subject to become gradually specified as the argument unfolds. (b) The negative route, ouk esti, "is not," or me einai, "not to be," is banned because sentences that adhere to it fail to refer (semantically speaking) to actual entities - the latter to be understood broadly, as will shortly be stated in thesis (d). (c) The argument does not depend on a confusion between the "is" of predication and the "is" of existence. (d) In the relevant contexts, esti and einai involve a "fused" or "veridical" use of the verb "to be"; in other words, esti or einai have the force of "is actual" or "obtains," or "is the case," envisaging a variable subject x that ranges over states-of-affairs. (1)

I formulate the four theses as abstractly and schematically as I can to do justice to the considerable variation of scholarly opinion that obtains within the consensus. It is clear, nevertheless, that the four theses concern fundamental points, and so one may even speak of the emergence of a standard Anglo-American interpretation of Parmenides-let me refer to it as "SI," for short." (p. 3)

"In several respects, which correspond to the criteria of adequacy just cited, SI falls short. I detail these shortfalls in the next five paragraphs. The considerations I offer do not amount-I hasten to emphasize - to a refutation of SI. But they do provide pointers of the directions in which Feyerabendian alternatives might be sought." (p. 5)

(1) See G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," (1960), W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy: Vol. II, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus, pp. 6-57; Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," (1968) Charles H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides" (1969); Michael C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (1971), pp. 127-148; David J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides" (1973); Edward Hussey, The Presocratics (1972), pp. 78-99; T. M. Robinson, "Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real" (1975) [references abbreviated].

My formulation both of the consensus and of alternatives fails, unfortunately, to take into account a major new interpretation of Parmenides: Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 155-230, which appeared after the present paper had already gone to print.
———. 1979. "'Nothing' as 'not-Being': some literary contexts that bear to Plato." In Arktouros. Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, edited by Bowersock, Glen W., Burkert, Walter and Putnam, Michael C.J., 319-329. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Reprinted in: John P. Anton, Anthony Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Vol. II: Plato, Albany: State University of New York Press 1983, pp. 59-69; in A. P. D. Mourelatos, After Parmenides: Studies on Language and Metaphysics in Early Greek Philosophy, Baden-Baden: Acadedmia Verlag 2022, pp. 36-45 and in A. P. D. Mourelatos, After Parmenides: Studies on Language and Metaphysics in Early Greek Philosophy, edited by Massimo Pulpito, Supplementa Eleatica 2, Baden Baden: Academia Verlg 2022, pp. 36-45.

"It has often been noticed that Plato, and before him Parmenides, assimilates "what is not" (μηδέν or ουδέν). (1) Given that the central use of "nothing" has important ties with the existential quantifier (''Nothing is here" = "It is not the case that there is anything here"), it has widely been assumed that contexts that document this assimilation also count as evidence that both within them and in cognate ontological contexts the relevant sense of "being" or "to be" is that of existence. That this assumption is not to be granted easily, has been compellingly argued by G. E. L. Owen. (2) His main concern was to show that the assumption is particularly mischievous in the interpretation of the Sophist, where he found it totally unwarranted. My own concern is to attack the assumption on a broader plane. "Nothing" in English has uses that do not depend on a tie with the existential quantifier. So too in Greek: meden or ouden can be glossed as "what does not exist," but it can also be glossed as "not a something," or in Owen's formulation, "'what is not anything, what not in anyway is': a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unindentifiable, no subject." (3) In effect, the assimilation of "what is not" to "nothing" may—in certain contexts—work in the opposite direction: not from "nothing" to "non-being" in the sense of non-existence; rather from "non-being" as negative specification or negative determination to "nothing" as the extreme of negativity or indeterminacy. To convey the sense involved in this reverse assimilation I borrow Owen's suggestive translation "not-being" for μέ ον, a rendering which makes use of an incomplete participle, rather than the complete gerund, of the verb "to be." (p. 319)

(1) See Parmenides B 6.2, cf. B 7.1, B 8.7-13, B 9.4; Plato Rep. 478 B 12-C 1, Tht. 189 A 10, Soph. 237 C7-E 2. Cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in Plato, I, Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), pp. 225-227.

(2) Owen, "Plato on NotBeing," pp. 241-248 and passim. For use of this assumption in interpreting Parmenides, see D. J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides," in Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, Phronesis, suppl. vol. 1 (Assen and New York, 1973) 12.
———. 1981. "Pre-Socratic Origins of the Principle that There are No Origins from Nothing." Journal of Philosophy no. 78:649-665.

"Even those who might question the truth of the ex nihilo nihil principle would readily concede that this principle itself could not have sprung from nothing. The origins are in pre-Socratic philosophy.

(...)

But the earliest text with a recognizable version of the ex nihilo nihil (henceforth ENN) is Parmenides B8.7-10.

Now since a concern with relations between Being and Not-Being (or Nothing)3 is saliently characteristic of Elea, the question arises whether Aristotle's attribution of ENN to philosophers before Parmenides may not be anachronistic. The suspicion of anachronism is reinforced when we consider the rationale for ENN Aristotle projects to his predecessors, all the way back to Thales. They held, Aristotle says, that "from what-is-not nothing could have come to be, because something must be present as a substratum" (Phys. I.8.191a30-31). The "because" clause here blatantly invokes Aristotle's own triadic ontology of matter-privation-form. If that is why Aristotle declares ENN to be pre-Eleatic in its origins and archaion, "ancient" (Metaph. I.984a27-984bl), why should we believe him? " (p. 649)

(...)

"This will not be a complete story of the origins of ENN, but I hope enough will be said to clear the way for renewed appreciation of the tenor of Aristotle's thesis.(*) My concern is not to vindicate Aristotle but to bring out conceptual connections and implications in pre-Socratic fragments." (p. 651)

(*) "from what-is-not nothing could have come to be, because something must be present as a substratum" (Phys. I.8.191a30-31).
———, ed. 1993. The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

V. Parmenides

11. Montgomery Furth: Elements of Eleatic Ontology 241; 12. G. E. L. Owen: Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present 271; 13. Karl Reinhardt: The Relation between the Two Parts of Parmenides’ Poem 293; 14. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos: The Deceptive Words of Parmenides’ "Doxa" 312-349.
———. 1993. "The Deceptive Words of Parmenides’ "Doxa"." In The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Mourelatos, Alexander P. D., 312-349. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

From The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 222-63; abridged and slightly revised in the present version.

"My aim in this study will be to show that two related concepts, drawn from the field of literary criticism, can serve to interpret faithfully both the facts of contrast and the facts of similarity. It will then appear that what is reflected in scholarly literature as controversy is actually a tension built into the argument and language of "Doxa," and that this tension is intrinsic to the philosophical message of this part of Parmenides' poem.

I have in mind the twin concepts of ambiguity and irony. It is actually surprising, considering that the goddess is impersonating a spokesman for mortal doxai, "opinions," and warns that her words are "deceptive," that these important analytical tools of the literary critic have been neglected in discussions of the second part of the poem.(6) Under "ambiguity" we should be prepared to allow any of the several types distinguished by modern literary critics,(7) although, as one would expect, only a smaller number can be illustrated in the rhetorical and poetic effects of the "Doxa." I will not pause over questions of classification

here; the type will become clear in the analysis of individual passages." (p. 313)

(6) I note, however, that Charles H. Kahn has remarked: "The ambiguity of Parmenides' style is intentional" (Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology [New York, 1960], p. 227).

(7) See William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, 3d ed. (New York, 1955),pp. v-vi; also William Bedell Stanford, Ambiguity in Greek Literature: Studies in Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1939), chs. 3, 4, and pp. 91-96.
———. 1999. "Parmenides and the Pluralists." Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 32:117-129.

The article discusses Patricia Curd's The Legacy of Parmenides (1998).

"Curd does not read Parmenides as a philosopher of the One. Her view is that Parmenides sought to establish formal criteria for what should properly count as 'what-is' or 'the real' (the physis or 'nature' of things) in a rationally constructed cosmology. Such an entity - or such entities - should indeed be unborn, imperishable, unchanging, and inherently complete." (pp. 117-118)

(,,,)

"In offering my own critical comments on the book, let me start by posing this question: Given that the basis for Curd's larger narrative is her interpretation of Parmenides, what exactly is that basis and how secure is it? Since half of the book is devoted to Parmenides, let me take up separately and at some length four salient theses in Curd's interpretation of Parmenides." (p. 120)
———. 2011. "Parmenides, Early Greek Astronomy, and Modern Scientific Realism." In Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e), edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 167-189. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Reprinted in Joe McCoy (ed.), Early Greek Philosophy. The Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason, Washington: The Catholic University Press 2013, pp. 91-112.

Summary: " “Doxa,” the second part of Parmenides' poem, is expressly disparaged by Parmenides himself as “off-track,” “deceptive,” and “lacking genuinecredence.” Nonetheless, there is good evidence that “Doxa” included some astronomical breakthroughs. The study presented here dwells on fragments B10, B14, and B15 from the “Doxa,” and especially on the term aidēla, interpreted as “causing disappearance,” in B10.3. The aim is to bring out the full astronomical import of Parmenides' realization of four related and conceptually fundamental facts: (i) that it is the sun’s reflected light on the moon that explains lunar phases; (ii) that it is the sun’s glare which, as the sun moves in its annual circuit, causes the gradual seasonal disappearance of stars and constellations, and that the absence of such glare explains their seasonal reappearance; (iii) that it is likewise the sun’s glare which causes the periodic disappearance, alternately, of the Morning Star and the Evening Star, and it is the absence of such glare that allows, alternately and respectively, for the reappearance of each of these stars; and (iv), a ready inference from (iii), the realization that the latter supposedly two stars are an identical planet.

In seeking to make sense of the paradoxical antithesis of “Truth” vs. a disparaged yet scientifically informed “Doxa,” the present study explores two modern analogues: Kant’s doctrine of the antithesis of “things-in-themselves” (or “noumena”) vs. “appearances” (Erscheinungen or “phaenomena”); and the twentieth-century doctrine of scientific realism, notably propounded by Wilfrid Sellars. The latter model is judged as more apt and conceptually more fruitful in providing an analogue for the relation between “Truth” and “Doxa.” "

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