Allaire, Edwin. 1963. "The Tractatus: Nominalistic or Realistic?" In Essays in Ontology, edited by Allaire, Edwin, 148-165. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Reprinted in: Copin & Beard (eds.) - Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus - pp. 167-186
Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret. 1959. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. London: Hutchinson University
Fourth edition St. Augustine Press 2001.
Arabi, Oussama. 1982. Wittgenstein: Langage Et Ontologie. Paris: Vrin.
Armstrong, David Malet. 1986. "The Nature of Possibility." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 16:575-594.
Bergmann, Gustav. 1960. "Ineffability, Method and Ontology." The Philosophical Review no. 69:18-40.
Reprinted in: Gustav Bergmann - Logic and reality (1964) and in: E. D. Klemke (ed.) - Essays on Wittgenstein (1971).
———. 1963. "Stenius on Wittgenstein's Tractatus." Theoria.A Swedish Journal of Philosophy:176-204.
Reprinted in: E. D. Klemke (ed.) - Essays on Wittgenstein (1971) and in: J. V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein: a fifteen volume collection. Vol 1: The
early philosophy, language as picture (1986).
Black, Max. 1964. A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.
Bloom, Stephen L. 1971. "A Completeness Theorem of 'Theories of Kind Wittgenstein'." Studia Logica no. 27:43-56.
Bogen, James. 1972. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language: Some Aspects of Its Development. London: Routldge and Kegan Paul.
Chapter 1: The picture theory and the Tractatus' ontology pp. 14-101.
———. 1996. "Wittgenstein's Tractatus." In Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume Ix: Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the Twetieth Century, edited
by Kearney, Richard, 157-192. New York: Routledge.
Bonino, Guido. 2004. "Russell, Frege E La Forma Logica Nel Tractatus." Rivista di Estetica no. 44:47-59.
"The main aim of this paper is that of suggesting that Wittgenstein's notion of logical form -- as it appears in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus -- is better understood
if it is conceived of as deriving from Russell's notion of logical form -- as put forth, for instance, in Theory of Knowledge --, rather than from Frege's notion of function. Such a
prevailingly historical aim is associated with a second one, theoretical-exegetical in character: trying to understand what exactly the logical form is in the Tractatus, and what its role is in the
context of the picture theory of language."
Bradley, Raymond. 1987. "Wittgenstein's Tractarian Essentialism." Australasian Jourmal of Philosophy no. 67:43-55.
———. 1992. The Nature of All Being: A Study of Wittgenstein's Modal Atomism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bremer, Manuel. 1999. "Die Welt Ist Die Gesamtheit Der Tatsachen, Nicht Der Dinge." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 57:111-131.
Brosch, Annette. 1995. Die Logik Des Tractatus: Eine Logisch-Semantische Untersuchung Dessen, "Was Der Fall" Sein Kann. New York: Peter Lang.
Candiotto, Maurizio. 2002. "I Concetti Tra Proprietà E Funzioni. Modelli Per L'incompletezza Ontologica: Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein." Rivista di Filosofia no.
"The Fregean notion of concept -- i.e., of the reference (vs. the sense) of a predicate -- is here compared with cognate notions in Husserl's Logical Investigations and in
Their common trait is unsaturatedness or existential dependency: the different treatment of this chief notion of formal ontology is in turn examined comparatively, with regard to
the conflicts and the alliances taking tacitly place between the three. In Frege's notion of concept, at any rate, an inner tension arises from its twofold nature of property and of truth-function:
saturation and function/argument are too heterogeneous models. Hints for a way out."
Canfield, John V. 1972. "A Model Tractatus Language." The Philosophical Forum no. 4:199-217.
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.), The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. A Fifteen Volume Collection, New York: Garland, 1986, Vol. I: The Early Philosophy -- Language as
———. 1976. "Tractatus Objects." Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel no. 6:81-99.
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A fifteen volume collection - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. II - Logic and ontology.
"Universals such as red are plausible examples of Tractatus objects, despite 6.3751. This view is linked to the Tractatus' conception of analysis and to its
phenomenalism. Facts are composed of universals bound together. The totality of facts forms the solipsistic universe; the universe as it appears. There is no subject to whom it appears; there are
only the constituent atomic facts. Appearances change; what was the case is no longer the case. What does not change are the eternally subsisting universals whose changing combinations constitute
———, ed. 1986. The Early Philosophy - Language as Picture. New York: Garland.
The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. A Fifteen Volume Collection. Vol. 1.
———, ed. 1986. Logic and Ontology. New York: Garland.
The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A fifteen volume collection. Vol. 2
Carruthers, Peter. 1989. Tractarian Semantics: Finding Sense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
———. 1990. The Metaphysics of the Tractatus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cerezo, Maria. 1996. "Does a Proposition Affirm Every Proposition That Follows from It?" In Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the History of
Logic, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo, Maria, 357-368. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The problem of the relations between the orders of signification, truth and logical consequence is central to logic. The way in which these relationships are established goes some
way towards determining the logical theory to which the writer subscribes. This problem has been a major issue in the history of logic. In this essay, I propose to show that the problem of these
relations is present in the course of the historical development of logic, and that there is no one solution to it. My aim is thus not to offer an answer to the question posed, but to highlight the
contrast between different solutions, approaching this issue from the standpoint defended by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.2 Nor do I intend to provide a
detailed explanation of Wittgenstein's view, but only to outline it and bring out the contrasts with other possible solutions, solutions which predate it by some considerable time." (Notes
———. 1998. "Nombrar Kripkeano Versus Nombrar Tractariano: Un Intento De Demarcación." Theoria.Revista de Teoria, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia no. 13:427-444.
"Raymond Bradley, in his book The Nature of All Being, has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus
Logico-philosophicus and aims to develop the modal dimensions that, in his opinion, are implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to reassess Bradley's interpretation of tractarian names
as rigid designators, by examining the tractarian notion of name and the Kripkean concept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, with a view to answering the question
as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities and differences between the two theories of meaning."
———. 2004. "La Nociones De Sachverhalt, Tatsache Y Sachlage En El Tractatus De Wittgenstein." Anuario Filosófico no. 37:455-479.
"In this paper, I develop some reflections on the interpretation of the notion of Sachverhalt in the Tractatus, with a view to show the complexity of the
tractarian view and to point out some tensions. I intend to elucidate this notion in the context of its relation to the notions of Tatsache and Sachlage, and in its relation to the
two main theories of the Tractatus, the truth-functions theory and the picture theory. I hope that this elucidation sheds some light on a possible comparison between Wittgenstein's and
Husserl's views and I point out some suggestions in this sense in the last part of the paper."
———. 2005. The Possibility of Language. Internal Tensions in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Cheung, Leo K.C. 2004. "Showing, Analysis and the Truth-Functionality of Logical Necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus." Synthese no. 139:81-105.
"This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unify logic by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis that a proposition shows its
sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression. Then I argue that, according to the Tractatus, the thesis that a
proposition shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the complete elimination of nonprimitive symbols, the analyticity thesis and the strong analyticity thesis. The
picture theory emerges as what provides the only acceptable account of an elementary proposition, subject to the constraint that a proposition must show its sense. The picture theory and the
analyticity thesis then entail the contingency thesis and the independence thesis which, together with the strong analyticity thesis, imply that all logical propositions are tautologies."
Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 2003. "Contentless Syntax, Ineffable Semantics, and Transcendental Ontology: Reflections on Wittgenstein's Tractatus." Kriterion.Zeitschrift für
Philosophie no. 17:1-6.
"Wittgenstein's Tractatus contains some very striking theses. We read, e.g., that "in a sense" we could not be wrong in logic, and that the whole subject matter of the
theory of modalities could be reconstructed on the ground of the insights in the mechanism of the linguistic reference. Yet in the light of the last sentences of Tractatus the whole
semantics turns out to be principally ineffable. In our paper we will try to clarify these matters. We show how these theses could be made plausible in the context of the transcendental
method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus."
Cocchiarella, Nino. 1974. "Logical Atomism and Modal Logic." Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel no. 4:41-66.
———. 1975. "Logical Atomism, Nominalism, and Modal Logic." Synthese no. 31:23-62.
Copi, Irving M. 1958. "Objects, Properties and Relations in the Tractatus." Mind no. 67:145-165.
Reprinted in: Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.) - Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus - pp. 167-186.
———. 1976. "Frege and Wittgenstein's Tractatus." Philosophy and History no. 6:447-461.
Reprinted in: Stuart Shanker (ed.) - Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical assessments - London, Croom Helm, 1986 - Vol. I.
Copi, Irving M., and Beard, Robert W., eds. 1966. Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Czermak, Johannes. 1978. "The Reducibility of a Logical Space with Many-Values Dimensions." In Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought. Proceedings of the Second
International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria), edited by Leinfellner, Elisabeth, 171-173. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
———. 1979. "Ein Mengentheoretisches Modell Der Tractatus Ontologie." In Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Critical Rationalism. Proceedings of the Third
International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13th to 19th August 1978, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria), edited by Berghel, Hal, Hübner, Adolf and Eckehart, Köhler, 162-164. Wien:
Daniels, Charles B., and Davison, John. 1973. "Ontology and Method in Wittgenstein's Tractatus." Noûs no. 7:233-247.
"Wittgenstein's method is that of showing the categories of being through a perspicuous language that mirrors the world. For Wittgenstein there are two categories of being, the
category of objects and the category of facts. These categories are radically disjoint: no object is a fact, no fact an object. n a perspicuous language facts cannot be named and objects cannot be
asserted. A perspicuous language has one and only one name for each object and one and only one proposition for each possible (and in addition one not-so-possible) fact. Material properties and
generality are shown to be analyzable; formal properties are seen as not expressible. The unity of reality shows in the general form of a proposition that is given in a manner far clearer and much
less ambiguous than Wittgenstein's own version. The Tractarian view of logic and mathematics is developed, and questions are raised concerning it that can be seen to occupy Wittgenstein in his later
Dayton, Eric. 1976. " Tractatus 5.54 - 5.5422." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 6:275-285.
Dejnozka, Jan. 1996. The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins. Realism and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. Lanham: Littlefield Adams
Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.
"While many books discuss the individual achievements of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine, few books consider how the thought of all four thinkers bears on the fundamental
questions of twentieth century philosophy. This book is about existence-identity connections in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. The thesis of the book is that there is a general form of
ontology, modified realism, which these great analysts share not only with each other, but with most great philosophers in the Western tradition. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there
are both real identities and conceptual (or linguistic) identities. In more familiar language, it is the view that there are both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in language). Thus
in modified realism, there are some real beings which can serve as a basis for accommodating possibly huge amounts of conceptual or linguistic relativity, or objectual identities' 'shifting'
as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore, on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic turn was not a radical break from traditional substance theory. Dejnožka also holds that
the conflict in all four analysts between private language arguments (which imply various kinds of realism) and conceptual "shifting" (which suggests conceptual relativism) is best resolved by, and
is in fact implicitly resolved by, their respective kinds of modified realism. Frege and Russell, not Wittgenstein and Quine, emerge as the true analytic progenitors of 'no entity without identity,'
offering between them at least twenty-nine private language arguments and fifty-eight 'no entity without identity' theories."
Elgin, Catherine. 1978. "The Impossibility of Saying What Is Shown." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 16:617-627.
Favrholdt, David. 1964. An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
Finch, Henry Le Roy. 1971. Wittgenstein. The Early Philosophy. An Exposition of the Tractatus. New York: Humanities Press.
Fogelin, Robert J. 1976. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Second revised edition 1987.
Frascolla, Pasquale. 2004. "On the Nature of Tractatus Objects." Dialectica no. 58:369-382.
"A conjecture on the metaphysical nature of Tractatus objects is put forward and its interpretative adequacy is tested. The clarification of the true import of the metaphor of
logical space and the recognition of the theoretical role played by Wittgenstein's explicit claim that the emptiness of logical space is conceivable enable us to account for the thesis that objects
are the substance of the world. Once objects are identified with those universal abstract entities which are qualia, and complexes or states of affairs with their concrete instances, some statements
of the Tractatus become liable to a consistent reading: that objects are colourless (TLP 2.0232); that space, time and colour are forms of objects (TLP 2.0251); that Leibniz's Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles, though still holding for complexes, does not apply to objects (TLP 2.0233). Lastly, it is shown how the interpretation of objects as qualia sheds a vivid light on the
theme of the relation between objects and time."
Italian version: Sulla natura degli oggetti nel Tractatus - Rivista di estetics. 44, 2004, pp. 61-73.
Friedlander, Eli. 2001. Signs of Sense: Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gale, Richard M. 1976. "Could Logical Space Be Empty?" In Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. Von Wright, edited by Hintikka, Jaakko, 85-104. Amsterdam:
García Suárez, Alfonso. 1996. "Are the Objects of the Tractatus Phenomenological Objects?" In Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the
History of Logic, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo, Maria, 343-355. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Geach, Peter Thomas. 1976. "Saying and Showing in Frege and Wittgenstein." In Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. Von Wright, edited by Hintikka, Jaakko, 54-70.
———. 1981. "Wittgenstein's Operator N." Analysis no. 41:168-171.
Glock, Hans-Johann. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. London: Blackwell.
———. 2006. "Truth in the Tractatus." Synthese no. 148:345-368.
Goddard, Leonard, and Judge, Brenda. 1982. The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Bundoora (Victoria): Australasian Association of Philosophy.
"The ontology of the Tractatus, in terms of which objects are characterized as property-less simples, is coherent provided Wittgenstein is not mistakenly taken to be a
constructive atomist building complexes from simples. A geometrical model is given to illustrate this. It is also shown that an ontology like that of the Tractatus removes much of the
conceptual puzzlement of modern particle physics and has implications for current debates about realism, possible worlds and rigid designators."
Granger, Gilles-Gaston. 1968. "Le Problème De L'espace Logique Dans Le Tractatus De Wittgenstein." L'Age de la Science:181-195.
Griffin, James Patrick. 1964. Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1998. "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Non-Existent States of Affairs." Acta Analytica:139-146.
"The history of philosophy is full of amazing quirks. One of them is the fact that just two basic ontologies have ruled the roost for the last two thousand years, namely, the
Platonic system and the Aristotelian system. But it is even more peculiar that neither system contains the category of state of affairs. The main reason for this neglect seems to be a consideration
which has plagued philosophy to this day. There can be no such things as states of affairs, because there simply are no states of affairs for false sentences. Russell, influenced by Wittgenstein's
criticism, tried to escape from this conclusion with his so-called multiple relation theory of judgment. But he does not succeed. Wittgenstein claimed to have avoided Russell's mistake and to have
presented a correct view about the nature of judgment in the Tractatus. But a study of the few references in the Tractatus to the ontological status of states of affairs represented by false
sentences does not show this."
Hadot, Pierre. 2004. "Réflexions Sur Les Limites Du Langage. A Propos Du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." Europe no. 905:12-30.
———. 2004. Wittgenstein Et Les Limites Du Langage. Paris: Vrin.
Haller, Rudolf. 1981. "Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy." In Austrian Philosophy. Studies and Texts, edited by Nyiri, J.C., 91-112. München: Philosophia Verlag.
Hamilton, Kelly Ann. 2002. "Darstellungen in the Principles of Mechanics and the Tractatus: The Representation of Objects in Relation in Hertz and Wittgenstein."
Perspectives on Science: Historical, Philosophical, Social no. 10:28-68.
"Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of the role of objects in our philosophical understanding of the logic of our language is critical for his early philosophy in the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus. While the important connections between Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics and Wittgenstein's Tractatus have long been recognized, recent work by Jed Buchwald has deepened
our knowledge of the importance of the object-orientation of Hertz's scientific work in a manner that should also deepen our understanding of the nature of objects in the Tractatus. I will argue that
there are important ontological links, involving "a certain physical scheme, one that had powerful implications for thinking as well as doing," between Hertz's work and Wittgenstein's early
Hieke, Alexander, and Maier, Maria. 1990. "A Formal Approach to the Ontology and the Picture-Theory of the Tractatus." In Wittgenstein. Towards a Re-Evaluation.
Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Centenary Celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria), edited by Haller, Rudolf and Brandl, Johannes.
Hintikka, Jaakko. 1969. "Quantification and the Picture Theory of Language." The Monist no. 53:204-230.
Reprinted in: Jaakko Hintikka - Logic, language-games and information. Kantian themes in the philosophy of logic - Oxford, Clarendon Press
Hintikka, Merrill B., and Hintikka, Jaakko. 1986. Investigating Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hochberg, Herbert. 1969. "Negation and Generality." Noûs no. 3:325-343.
Reprinted in: Elmer D. Klemke (ed.) - Essays on Wittgenstein - Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1971
———. 1971. "Facts, Possibilities and Essences in the Tractatus." In Essays on Wittgenstein, edited by Klemke, Elmer D., 485-533. Urbana: University of Illinois
———. 1978. Thought, Fact and Reference: The Origins and Ontology of Logical Atomism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
———. 2001. Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein: The Revival of Realism. Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen.
Horn, Patrick Rogers. 2005. Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the Unity of Language. Reality and Discourse without Metaphysics. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Hyder, David Jalal. 2002. The Mechanics of Meaning. Propositional Content and the Logical Space of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Ishiguro, Hide. 2001. "The So-Called Picture Theory: Language and the World in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." In Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, edited by Glock,
Hans-Johann, 26-46. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
Jacquette, Dale. 2001. "Analysis of Quantifiers in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Survey." Logic Analysis and History of Philosophy no. 4:191-202.
"In the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can and cannot be said in any language by the general form of propositions. I explain
Wittgenstein's method and discuss Robert J. Fogelin's criticism of what he takes to be the incompleteness of Wittgenstein's general form of propositions in his exposition of the ' Naive
Constructivism of the Tractatus.' [Chapter 6 of: Robert J. Fogelin - Wittgenstein pp. 78-85]. I argue that Fogelin's objection is mistaken, and that, contrary to Fogelin's claim,
Wittgenstein's method when properly applied produces all of the well-formed formulas with mixed multiple quantification that Fogelin maintains it cannot provide. I conclude by offering a critical
comparison of similar solutions proposed, among others, by P.T. Geach, Scott Soames, and Matthias Varga von Kibéd."
———. 2004. "Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the Logic of Fiction." In Wittgenstein and Philsophy of Literature, edited by Gibson, John and Huemer, Wolfgang, 305-317. London:
"Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus articulates a logic and semantics for all possible languages in which states of affairs ( Sachverhalten, Tatsachen)
as truth-makers are pictured in sentences under analysis. Wittgenstein considers both existent and nonexistent states of affairs as pictured, respectively, by true and false sentences. This raises
the question as to whether the Tractatus constitutes or provides the formal basis for a logic of fiction. I identify four criteria for a logic of fiction, and argue that the
Tractatus satisfies only the first three. The remaining criterion has to do with logical analysis of a fictional character's psychology internal narration. These are excluded by
Wittgenstein's application of Occam's razor in defense of the general form of proposition in the case of fiction just as they are in nonfictional discourse."
Kannisto, Heikki. 1986. Thoughts and Their Subject. A Study of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica.
Kaplan, David. 1964. Foundations of Intensional Logic.
Unpublished Ph. D. thesis; available at UMI Dissertation Express, reference number: 6408563.
Kenny, Anthony John Patrick. 1973. Wittgenstein. London: Allen Lane.
Second revised edition: Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2006.
Klement, Kevin C. 2004. "Putting Form before Function: Logical Grammar in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein." Philosopher's Imprint no. 4:1-47.
"The positions of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the priority of complexes over (propositional) functions are sketched, challenging those who take the "judgment centered"
aspects of the Tractatus to be inherited from Frege not Russell. Frege's views on the priority of judgments are problematic, and unlike Wittgenstein's. Russell's views on these matters, and
their development, are discussed in detail, and shown to be more sophisticated than usually supposed.
Certain misreadings of Russell, including those regarding the relationship between propositional functions and universals, are exposed. Wittgenstein's and Russell's views on logical
grammar are shown to be very similar. Russell's type theory does not countenance types of genuine entities nor metaphysical truths that cannot be put into words, contrary to conventional wisdom. I
relate this to the debate over "inexpressible truths" in the Tractatus. I lastly comment on the changes to Russell's views brought about by Wittgenstein's influence."
Klemke, Elmer D., ed. 1971. Essays on Wittgenstein. Urbana: University Of Illinois Press.
———. 1971. "The Ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus." In Essays on Wittgenstein, edited by Klemke, Elmer D., 104-119. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Kluge, Eike Henner. 1973. "Objects as Universals: A Re-Appraisal of the Tractatus." Dialogue no. 12:64-77.
Küng, Guido. 1967. Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language. An Enquiry into the Contemporary Views on Universals. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company.
Translated from German by E. C. M. Mays, and revised by the author]
———. 1983. "The Difficulty with the Well-Formedness of Ontological Statements." Topoi no. 2:111-119.
Landini, Gregory. 2009. Wittgenstein's Apprenticeship with Russell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Latraverse, François. 2002. "Signe, Proposition, Situation: Éléments Pour Une Lecture Du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no.
Levvis, Gary. 1998. "The So-Called (and Actual!) Realism of the Tractatus." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 54:45-70.
"David Pears's contention that the Tractatus [in: The false prison - vol. 1 - Chapter 6: The basic Realism of the Tractatus] is to be understood as
advancing a form of metaphysical realism is defended against McGuinness's view that Tractatus 1-2.063 is to be treated just as introducing a metaphysical myth that may be employed to bring
into prominence salient features of propositions. Starting with a discussion of the involved difficulties, e.g., determining (1) whether Wittgenstein does, in fact, provide an argument for the
existence of simple objects, (2) what this object is, and (3) what role the existence of simple objects plays within the Picture Theory of the Proposition, Wittgenstein's argument for the existence
of simple objects is reconstructed, augmenting Pears's existing account by providing further details of why Wittgenstein held that determinacy of sense requires the existence of simple objects."
Lokhorst, Gert-Jan C. 1988. "Ontology, Semantics, and Philosophy of Mind in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A Formal Reconstruction." Erkenntnis no. 29:35-75.
"The paper presents a formal explication of the early Wittgenstein's views on ontology, the syntax and semantics of an ideal logical language, and the propositional attitudes. It
will be shown that Wittgenstein gave a 'language of thought' analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions, and that his ontological views imply that such ascriptions are truth-functions of (and
supervenient upon) elementary sentences. Finally, an axiomatization of a quantified doxastic modal logic corresponding to Tractarian semantics will be given."
Lombardi, Olimpia Iris. 1999. "¿Qué Son Los Objetos Del Tractatus?" Revista de Filosofia (Spain) no. 12:55-76.
"In this paper we provide an interpretation of the concept "object", in the context of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. We argue that (1) "objects" are logical entities, the nodes
of the logical net which is common to all possible worlds; (2) general words are not "names" and, therefore, "objects" are particulars."
Ludwig, Jan. 1976. "'Substance' and 'Simple Objects' in Tractatus 2.02ff." Philosophical Studies no. 29:307-318.
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A fifteen volume collection - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. II - Logic and ontology.
Marion, Mathieu. 2004. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Introduction Au Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Maslow, Alexander. 1961. A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Berkeley: University of California Press.
From the Preface: "This study in Wittgenstein Tractatus is substantially as it was written in 1933".
Reprinted by Thoemmes Press in 1997.
Maury, André. 1977. The Concepts of "Sinn" and "Gegenstand" in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
" It is argued that the Tractatus notion of propositional sense contains an irreducible modal element. An interpretation of Wittgenstein's early notion of "bipolarity" is
given. It is further argued that explicit recognition of the modal element helps us to understand the particular form of the Tractatus ontology. Wittgenstein's early views on sense and
modality are contrasted with Frege's and Russell's views. Part II is a defense of the view that the Tractatus objects include predicates. The argument is backed up by reference to later
unpublished writings by Wittgenstein. The
development of his views on names and predicates are examined."
McDonough, Richard. 1986. The Argument of the Tractatus. Its Relevance to Contemporary Theories of Logic, Language, Mind, and Philosophical Truth. Albany: State University
of New York Press.
McGinn, Marie. 2006. Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Logic and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McGuinness, Brian. 1972. "Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein' "Notes on Logic"." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 26:440-460.
———. 1981. "The So-Called Realism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus." In Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, edited by Block, I., 60-73. Oxford:
Reprinted in: B. F. McGuinness - Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected papers - pp. 82-94.
———. 2002. Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected Papers. London: Routledge.
McManus, Denis. 2006. The Enchantment of Words. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milkov, Nikolay. 2001. "Tractarian Scaffoldings." Prima Philosophia no. 14:399-414.
"Wittgenstein's Tractarian ontology has its historical roots in Russell's programme for constructionalism. There is an essential difference between the constructionalism of Russell
and that of Wittgenstein though. Whereas Tractarian ontology is approximately Aristotelian, Russell's logical atomism accepts a Platonic penetration of the autonomous world of logical forms into the
autonomous world of facts. Russell's logical constructionalism, more precisely, uses the metaphor of a 'logical skeleton' on which the data of experience are fleshed out. In opposition, in the
Tractatus Wittgenstein doesn't speak of a skeleton but introduces the concept of 'logical scaffolding' and also of the 'scaffolding of the world' instead. This terminology reflects a new type of
ontology, as well as a new type of logic, radically different from that of Russell. Its most important concepts are that of 'object' and 'state of affairs', both of them used in new, idiosyncratic
Miller III, Hugh. 1995. "Tractarian Semantics for Predicate Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 16:197-215.
"It is a little understood fact that the system of formal logic presented in Wittgenstein's' Tractano provides the basis for an alternative general semantics for a predicate
calculus that is consistent and coherent. essentially independent of the metaphysics of logical atomism. and philosophieall illuminating in its own right. The purpose of this paper is threefold: to
describe the general characteristics of a Tractarian-style semantics, to defend the 'Fulcrums system against the charge of expressive incompleteness as levelled by Robert Fogelin, and to give a
semantics for a formal language that is the Tractarian equivalent of a first-order predicate calculus. Of note in regard to the latter is the fact that a Trachuus-style truth-definition makes no
appeal to the technical trick of defining truth in terms of the satisfaction of predicates by infinite sequences of objects, yet is materially equivalent to the usual Tarski-style
Morrison, James C. 1968. Meaning and Truth in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The Hague: Mouton.
Mounce, Howard O. 1981. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An Introduction. London: Basil Blackwell.
———. 2001. "The Logical System of the Tractatus." In Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, edited by Glock, Hans-Johann, 59-93. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
Mudersbach, Klaus. 1978. "A Tentative Axiomatization of the Ontology of the Tractatus." In Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought. Proceedings of the
Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria), edited by Leinfellner, Elisabeth, 159-161. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Müller, Anselm Winfried. 1967. Ontologie in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Bonn: Bouvier.
Newen, Albert. 1991. "Interpretation Und Rekonstruktion Der Ontologie in Wittgensteins Tractatus." Grazer Philososphiche Studien no. 41:33-65.
Noonan, H.W. 1975. " Tractatus 2.0211 - 2.0212." Analysis no. 36:147-149.
"The existence of objects as substances. Tractatus's relationship to the theory of the proposition in Frege."
Nordmann, Alfred. 2005. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oaklander, Nathan L., and Miracchi, Silvano. 1980. "Russell, Negative Facts, and Ontology." Philosophy of Science no. 47:434-455.
"Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the
characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the ideal language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts
is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true or false. Second, that the ontological use of the ideal language is
incompatible with the requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this basis we conclude that despite elaborations by recent proponents, the doctrine of negative facts lacks
adequate support, and perhaps more importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the ideal language from the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation."
Omyla, Mieczyslaw. 1986. Zarys Logiki Niefregowskiej (an Outline of Non-Fregean Logic). Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnicztwo Naukowe.
Book written in Polish.
Ostrow, Matthew B. 2002. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A Dialectical Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Page, James. 1997. "Unconfigured Tractarian Objects." Philosophical Investigations no. 20:39-50.
"According to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the world consists of atomic objects arranged in various configurations and the ways the world might be are determined by the ways
these objects can be configured. I question whether these very objects can be unconfigured as well. Black and Fogelin are nearly alone in their attention to this issue but reach opposite conclusions.
Black asserts, essentially without argument, that atomic objects can be configured, while Fogelin is committed to the view that they cannot. I think Black is right and my aim is to show why."
Pears, David Francis. 1970. Wittgenstein. New York: Viking Press.
———. 1972. "The Ontology of the Tractatus." Teorema:49-58.
"The article is concerned with the status of the ontology of the Tractatus. In it I argue 1) that, although the ontology of the Tractatus is a metaphysic of
language like Kant's metaphysic of experience, it is supposed to set the standard of objectivity, and to yield the firmest conclusions about reality; 2) that Wittgenstein abandoned this ontology when
he abandoned the theory of language from which it had been deduced, because it expressed too narrow a view of the possible forms that language may take. The article is an attempt to establish in what
way Wittgenstein's later philosophy is more anthropocentric than his early philosophy."
———. 1977. "The Relation between Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Propositions and Russell's Theories of Judgement." The Philosophical Review no. 86:177-196.
Reprinted in: S. G. Shanker (ed.) - Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical assessments - Vol. 1 - From the Notebooks to Philosophical grammar: the construction and dismantling of the
Tractatus (1986) - pp. 92-107.
———. 1987. The False Prison. A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Contents of the first volume: Abreviations XI; Part I: Introduction 1; 1. Wide-angle view 3; 2. Close-up: the early system 20; 3. Close-up: the late system 34; Part II: Inside the
early system 61; 4. Logical Atomism 63; 5. The basic realism of the Tractatus 88; 6. Sentences as pictures 115; 7. Solipsism 153; 8. Review and prospect 192; Bibliography 197; Index 201.
Perszyk, Kenneth. 1988. "The Ontology of the Tractatus." Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel no. 18:39-59.
" Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus as an extended answer to the question "what must the world be like for the symbolic logic developed by Frege, Russell, and Whitehead to
apply to it?" helps elucidate the connection between its theory of language and its ontology. My main argument is to show that the ontology is derived from the logic of Principia mathematica
taken to its completion. throughout the Tractatus. Wittgenstein takes a stance on a number of traditional problems in the history of philosophy, and my aim in discussing some of these is to
place the Tractatus in broader historical perspective."
Perzanowski, Jerzy. 1984. "Some Ontological and Semantical Puzzles of Wittgenstein's Tractatus." In Aesthetics. Proceedings of the 8th International Wittgenstein
Symposium, 15th - 21st August 1983, Kirchberg Am Wessel (Österreich), edited by Haller, Rudolf, 224-230. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
———. 1985. "Some Observations on Modal Logics and the Tractatus." In Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology. Proceedings of the 9th International Wittgenstein
Symposium, 19th-26th August 1984, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Österreich), edited by Roderick, Chisholm, 544-550. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
———. 1989. Logiki Modalne a Filozofia. Krakow: Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego.
———. 1990. "Towards Post-Tractatus Ontology." In Wittgenstein. Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium, Centenary Celebration, 13th
to 20th August 1989 Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria), edited by Haller, Rudolf and Brandl, Johannes, 185-199. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1992. "Ce Qu'il Y a De Non Fregéen Dans La Sémantique Du Tractatus De Wittgenstein Et Pourquoi?" In Wittgenstein Et La Philosophie Aujourd'hui: Journées Internationales
Créteil-Paris, 16-21 Juin 1989 À L'occasion Du Centenaire De La Naissance De Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), edited by Sebestik, Jan and Soulez, Antonia, 163-177. Paris: Klincksieck.
Translated in English as: What is non-Fregean in the semantics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and why? - Axiomathes, 1993, 4, pp. 357-372.
Piana, Giovanni. 1973. Interpretazione Del Tractatus Di Wittgenstein. Milano: Il Saggiatore.
Pippin, Robert B. 1979. "Negation and Not-Being in Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Plato's Sophist." Kant Studien no. 70:179-196.
Plochmann, George Kimball, and Lawson, Jack B. 1962. Terms in Their Propositional Contexts in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An Index. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Plourde, Jimmy. 2000. "Ontologie Der Modalitäten Im Tractatus." Metaphysica no. 1:19-39.
———. 2005. "Wittgenstein Et Les Théories Du Jugement De Russell Et De Meinong." Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Association no. 44:249-283.
"Un des principaux enjeux de la théorie du jugement de Russell consistait à élaborer une théorie qui n'engage pas à admettre des entités complexes vraies, fausses ou inexistantes
tels que les objectifs meinongiens. Dans l'étude du débat entre Russell et Wittgenstein sur cette théorie, on n'a jamais sérieusement envisagé que Wittgenstein n'ait pas suivi Russell sur cette
question et qu'il ait plutôt adopté une position plus proche de celle de Meinong. Dans cet article, j'aborde cette question et soutiens que Wittgenstein a trouvé la solution aux problèmes posés par
la théorie du jugement de Russell dans la théorie de l'image et qu'il a longuement hésité dans les Carnets entre des versions de la théorie de l'image en accord avec la position de Russell et des
versions en accord avec celle de Meinong. Enfin, je soutiens qu'il a finalement tranché la question dans le Tractatus en optant pour une théorie du type de celle privilégiée par Meinong."
Poulain, Jacques. 1973. "La Possibilité Des Propositions Ontologiques Dans Le Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." Les Études Philosophiques:529-552.
Proops, Ian. 2000. Logic and Language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. New York: Garland Publishers.
"This work is a minimally revised version of my Harvard doctoral thesis, which was written during the years 1994-1998. My understanding of Wittgenstein's early philosophy has, of
course, continued to evolve since completing the thesis, but because the attempt to incorporate these new ideas seemed likely to result in a wholly new work, I have decided to present the
dissertation in its original form, with the exception of a few minor and mostly stylistic changes."
———. 2004. "Wittgenstein on the Substance of the World." European Journal of Philosophy no. 12:106-126.
"A reading is offered of Wittgenstein's argument for substance in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein's talk of "substance" is an allusion to Kant's conception
of substance in the
"First Analogy" of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, the concept of some stuff that exists at all times and such that all existence changes are alterations of it.
Tractarian substance is the
modal analogue of Kantian substance. It is that which "endures," not literally through time, but figuratively through a "space" of possible worlds. To argue for substance is
therefore to argue for necessary existents. From this starting point, a detailed reconstruction of the argument for substance is developed and its coherence (if not soundness) defended."
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. 1923. "Critical Notice of the Tractatus." Mind no. 32:465-478.
Reprinted in: F. P. Ramsey - The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays - Edited by R. B. Braithwaite, with a preface by G. E. Moore - New York, The
Humanities Press, 1931 (Reprinted Patterson, Littlefield, Adams, 1965)
Reck, Erich H., ed. 2002. From Frege to Wittgenstein. Perspective in Early Analytic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rhees, Rush. 1969. ""Ontology" and "Identity" in the Tractatus. A Propos of Black's Companion." In Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, edited by Winch,
Peter, 51-65. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
———. 1969. "Ontology and Identity in the Tractatus." In Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, edited by Winch, Peter, 51-65. London: Routledge & Kegan
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.), The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. A Fifteen Volume Collection, New York: Garland, 1986, Vol. II: Logic and Ontology.
Richter, Duncan. 2004. Historical Dictionary of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
Russell, Bertrand. 1919. "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism." The Monist.
Reprinted in: B. Russell - Logic and knowledge. Essays 1901-1950 - Edited by Robert Charles Marsh - London, Allen & Unwin, 1956, pp. 175-282
Shanker, Stuart, ed. 1986. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical Assessments. London: Croom Helm.
Vol. 1: From the Notebooks to Philosophical Grammar. The construction and dismantling of the Tractatus; Vol. 2: From Philosophical investigations
to On certainty: Wittgenstein's later philosophy; Vol. 3: From the Tractatus to Remarks on the foundations of mathematics: Wittgenstein on the philosophy of mathematics;
Vol. 4: From theology to sociology: Wittgenstein's impact on contemporary thought.
Simons, Peter M. 1981. "Logical and Ontological Independence in the Tractatus." In Ethics: Foundations, Problems, and Applications. Proceedings of the Fifth
International Wittgenstein Symposium, 25th to 31st August 1980, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria), edited by Morscher, Edgar and Stranzinger, Rudolf, 464-467. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
———. 1985. "The Old Problem of Complex and Fact." Teoria (Italy) no. 5:205-225.
Reprinted in: P. Simons - Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays - Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1992 pp. 319-338.
———. 1986. "Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus? A Brentanian Look at Wittgenstein, and a Moral." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 28:165-186.
Skyrms, Brian. 1981. "Tractarian Nominalism." Philosophical Studies no. 40:199-206.
———. 1981. "Tractarian Nominalism (for Wilfrid Sellars)." Philosophical Studies no. 40:199-206.
Soames, Scott. 1983. "Generality, Truth Functions, and Expressive Capacity in the Tractatus." The Philosophical Review no. 92:573-589.
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.), The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. A Fifteen Volume Collection, New York: Garland, 1986, Vol. II: Logic and Ontology.
Specht, Ernst Konrad. 1967. The Foundations of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy. Manchester: Manchster University Press.
Original edition: Die sprachphilosophischen und ontologischen Grundlagen im Spätwerk Ludwig Wittgensteins - Cologne, Kölner Universitäts-Vverlag, 1963.
The first two chapters are about the Tractatus.
Stegmüller, Wolfgang. 1966. "Eine Modelltheoretische Präzisierung Der Wittgensteinschen Bildtheorie." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 7:181-195.
Stenius, Erik. 1960. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 1976. "The Sentence as a Function of Its Constituents in Frege and in the Tractatus." In Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G. H. Von Wright, edited by
Hintikka, Jaakko, 71-84. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Stevens, Graham. 2007. "From Russell's Paradox to the Theory of Judgement: Wittgenstein and Russell on the Unity of the Proposition." Theoria.A Swedish Journal of
Philosophy no. 70:28-61.
"It is fairly well known that Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment has a devastating effect on the latter's philosophical enterprise. The
exact nature of those criticisms, however, and the explanation for the severity of their consequences, has been a source of confusion and disagreement amongst both Russell and Wittgenstein scholars.
In this paper, I offer an interpretation of those criticisms which shows them to be consonant with Wittgenstein's general critique of Russell's conception of logic and which serves to elucidate some
of the notoriously enigmatic passages of the Tractatus. In particular, I seek to show the continuity of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the theory of judgment with his remarks on Russell's
paradox and the theory of types."
Stocker, Barry, ed. 2004. Post-Analytic Tractatus. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Stokhof, Martin J.B. 2002. World and Life as One. Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
"The book's main thesis is twofold. It argues that the ontological theory of the Tractatus is fundamentally dependent on its logical and linguistic doctrines: the tractarian world
is the world as it appears in language and thought. It also maintains that this interpretation of the ontology of the Tractatus can be argued for not only on systematic grounds, but also via the
contents of the ethical theory that it offers. Wittgenstein's views on ethics presuppose that language and thought are but one way in which we interact with reality."
Sullivan, Peter M. 2000. "The Totality of Facts." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 100:175-192.
"Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, conceives the world as "the totality of facts." Type-stratification threatens that conception: the totality of facts is an obvious example
of an illegitimate totality. Wittgenstein's notion of truth-operation evidently has some role to play in avoiding that threat, allowing propositions, and so facts, to constitute a single type. The
paper seeks to explain that role in a way that integrates the "philosophical" and "technical" pressures on the notion of an operation."
Suszko, Roman. 1968. "Ontology in the Tractatus of L. Wittgenstein." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 9:7-33.
———. 1968. "Ontologia W "Traktacie' L. Wittgenstein" (Ontology in the Tractatus by L. Wittgenstein)." Studia Filozoficzne:97-120.
Paper witten in Polish
———. 1972. "Description in Theories of Kind W." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 1:8-13.
Co-author: Mieczyslaw Omyla
———. 1972. "Definitions in Theories of Kind W." Bulletin of the Section of Logic no. 1:14-19.
Co-author: Mieczyslaw Omyla
———. 1975. "Abolition of the Fregean Axiom." In Logic Colloquium. Symposium on Logic Held at Boston, 1972-73, edited by Parikh, Rohit, 169-239. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Tejedor, Chon. 2003. "Sense and Simplicity: Wittgenstein's Argument for Simple Objects." Ratio.An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy no. 16:272-289.
"This paper puts forward an alternative interpretation of the argument for simple objects advanced in the 2.0s of the Tractatus. In my view, Wittgenstein derives the
simplicity of objects directly from his account of possible states, complex objects and senseful propositions. The key to Wittgenstein's argument is the idea that, if there were no simple objects,
possible states would not be necessarily possible. If this were the case, however, there would be no senseful language, in Wittgenstein's view. One of the subsidiary aims of this paper is to question
the idea that Wittgenstein posits simples because, without them, language would be infinitely analyzable."
Voltolini, Alberto. 2003. "Possibilia, Qualia E Sensibilia." Rivista di Estetica no. 43:127-137.
"In this paper I will try to show the following two things. First, Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus semantically exiges that Tractarian objects be conceived of
as possibilia in the sense of Russell (1903), namely as objects that may exist as well not exist. Second, the Tractatus's general ontological framework suggests to integrate this
onto-semantical conception with a view of such objects not as qualia but rather as sensibilia in the sense of Russell (1914), namely as possible sense-data."
Weissman, David. 1967. "Ontology in the Tractatus." Philosophy and Phenomnological Research no. 27:475-501.
White, Roger M. 2006. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Readers' Guide. New York: Continuum.
Wolniewicz, Boguslaw. 1968. "A Difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism." In Akten Des Xiv. Internationalen Kongresses Für Philosophie. Wien, 2. - 9.
September 1968 - Vol. Ii, 263-267. Wien: Herder.
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp. 193-197
———. 1968. Rzczy I Fakty. Wstep Do Pierwszei Filozofii Wittgensteina (Things and Facts. An Introduction to the First Philosophy of Wittgenstein). Warsaw: Panstwowe
Book witten in Polish.
———. 1969. "A Note on Black's 'Companion'." Mind no. 78:141.
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - p. 229
———. 1969. "A Parallelism between Wittgensteinian and Aristotelian Ontologies." In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. Iv, edited by Cohen, Robert S. and
Wartofsky, Marx W., 208-217. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company.
Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the philosophy of science 1966/1968.
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp. 198-207
———. 1969. "O Formalnych Wlasnosciach Pojecia Faktu (on Formal Properties of the Notion of Fact)." Rozprawy Filozoficzne:413-423.
Paper written in Polish.
———. 1971. "Wittgensteinian Foundation of Non-Fregean Logic." In Contemporary East European Philosophy. Vol. 3, edited by D'Angelo, Edward, DeGrood, David and Riepe, Dale,
231-243. Bridgeport: Spartacus Books.
———. 1972. "The Notion of Fact as a Modal Operator." Teorema:59-66.
"The notion of fact: FP = 'It is a fact that P' is characterized axiomatically, and the ensuing modal systems shown to be equivalent to T, S4 and S5 respectively."
———. 1973. "Zur Semantik Des Satzkalküls: Frege Und Wittgenstein." In Der Mensch - Subjekt Und Objekt (Festchrift Für Adam Schaff), edited by Borbé, Tasso. Wien:
———. 1978. "Wittgenstein Und Der Positivismus." In Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism. Proceedings of the Third International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13th
to 19th August 1978, Kirchberg Am Wechsel (Austria), edited by Berghel, Hal, Hübner, Adolf and Eckehart, Köhler. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
———. 1979. "A Wittgensteinian Semantics for Propositions." In Intention and Intentionality. Essay in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe, edited by Diamond, Cora and Teichman,
Jenny, 165-178. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
———. 1982. "A Formal Ontology of Situations." Studia Logica no. 41:381-413.
"A generalized Wittgensteinian semantics for propositional languages is presented, based on a lattice of elementary situations. Of these, maximal ones are possible worlds,
constituting a logical space; minimal ones are logical atoms, partitioned into its dimensions. A verifier of a proposition is an elementary situation such that if real it makes true. The reference
(or objective) of a proposition is a situation, which is the set of all its minimal verifiers. (Maximal ones constitute its locus.) Situations are shown to form a Boolean algebra, and the Boolean set
algebra of loci is its representation. Wittgenstein's is a special case, admitting binary dimensions only."
1. Elementary Situations
1.1.The Axioms; 1.2.Some Consequences; 1.3. W-Independence; 1.4.States of Affairs;
2. Sets of Elementary Situations
2.1.The Semigroup of SE"-Sets; 2.2.The Lattice of Minimal SE"-Sets; 2.3.Q-Spaces and V-Sets; 2.4.V-Equivalence and Q-Equivalence; 2.4.V-Classes and V-Sets;
3. Objectives of Propositions
3.1. Verifiers of Propositions; 3.2. Verifying and Forcing; 3.3. Situations and Logical Loci; 3.4. Loci and Objectives of Compound Propositions 3.5. The Boolean Algebra of
———. 1983. "Logical Space and Metaphysical Systems." Studia Logica no. 42:269-284.
"The paper applies the theory presented in "A formal ontology of situations" (Studia Logica, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical systems by interpreting them
as different ontologies of situations.
Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism. Moreover, the relation of that
theory to the "situation semantics" of Perry and Barwise is discussed."
———. 1985. Ontologia Sytuacji (Ontology of Situations). Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnicztwo Naukowe.
Book written in Polish.
———. 1990. "The Essence of Logical Atomism: Hume and Wittgenstein." In Wittgenstein. Eine Neubewertung. Akten 14. Internationale Wittgenstein-Symposium. Vol. 1, 106-111.
———. 1999. Logic and Metaphysics. Studies in Wittgenstein's Ontology of Facts. Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne.
Contents: Preface 11; Discontinuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy 13; 1. Elementary situations as a lattice of finite length 19; Elementary situations as a semilattice 73; 3.
Independence 127; 4. Elementary situations generalized 137; 5. Auxiliary studies 193; 5.1 The Logical Atomisms of Russell and Wittgenstein 193; 5.2 A parallelism between Wittgenstein and Aristotle
198; 5.3 Frege's semantics 207; 5.4. The notion of fact as a modal operator 218; 5.5 "Tractatus" 5.541 - 5.542 224; 5.6 History of the concept of a Situation 229; 6. Offshoots 243 6.1 Languages and
codes 243; 6.2 Logic and hermeneutics 254; 6.3 Kotarbinski's Reism 265; 6.4 On Bayle's critique of theodicy 271; 6.5 Elzenberg's axiology 286; 6.6 Needs and values 293; 6.7 Suszko: a reminiscence
302; Supplements 307; Indices: Index of subjects 317; Index of names 326; Index of Tractatus references 329.
Wright, Georg Henrik von. 1971. "Historical Introduction. The Origin of Wittgenstein's Tractatus." In Prototractatus. An Early Version of Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, edited by McGuinness, Brian. London: Routledge.
Revised and expanded in G. H. von Wright - Wittgenstein - Oxford, Blackwell, 1982.
———. 1972. "Some Observations on Modal Logic and Philosophical Systems." In Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, edited by Olson, Raymond E. and Paul, Anthony M., 17-26.
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.
———. 1982. "Modal Logic and the Tractatus." In Wittgenstein, 185-200. Oxford: Blackwell.
Zemach, Eddy M. 1976. " Sachverhalte, Tatsachen and Properties." Ratio.An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy no. 17:49-51.
Zheng, Yiwei. 1999. "Les Configurations Et Les Propriétés Des Objets Dans Le Tractacus De Wittgenstein." Philosophical Investigations no. 22:136-165.
"In this paper I approach some central problems concerning the Tractarian objects, e.g., the picture theory, the internal and external properties of objects, and the debate whether
properties and relations should be included as the Tractarian objects, from a study of configurations of objects. I argue that a detailed study of configurations of objects offers us new insights and
helps us reach solutions to some of the important disputes concerning the characteristics of objects, e.g., the dispute whether the Tractarian objects include properties and relations."