Heider, Daniel. 2007. "Is Suarez's Concept of Being Analogical or Univocal?" American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:21-42.
"This article deals with the question of Suárez's conception of being, which prima facie seems to oscillate between a Scotistic univocal conception and a conception of
being according to the analogy of intrinsic attribution. The paper intends to show that Suárez's doctrine can in no way be interpreted as representative of the univocal conception, and proceeds in
six steps. First, it highlights the importance of the "uncommon doctor"'s theory of the unity of both the formal and the objective concepts of being. In the second part, the paper asks how the
concept of being can, without any internal differentiation and structure, give rise to the different relations that it has to the natures subordinated to it. In the second and the third parts, this
question receives an answer against the background of Suárez's critique of Scotus's conception, and with the help of his theory of the radical intimate transcendence of being. In the fourth section,
there follows an exposition of Suárez's doctrine on the explication of the concept of being. The fifth section offers a brief presentation of the significance of esse for ratio
In the last section, the author places his interpretation in the general context of the Metaphysical Disputations."
———. 2009. "The Nature of Suárez's Metaphysics. Disputationes Metaphysicae and Their Main Systematic Strains." Studia Neoaristotelica no. 6:99-110.
"The paper presents seven basic features of Francisco Suárez's metaphysics. They are as follows: "Univocalization" of the concept of being and transcendental properties,
"reification" of the act-potency doctrine, "ontologization" of individuality, "conceptualization" of the Scotist perspective, "existential" character of the concept of being, "epistemologization" and
"methodologization" of metaphysics. Whereas the first five are indicated as remaining in the preserve of the traditional scholastic philosophy, the last two are taken as portending the methodological
priority of the subjective states of affairs of early modern "main-stream" philosophy."
———. 2009. "The Unity of Suárez's Metaphysics." Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale no. 34:475-505.
———. 2014. Universals in Second Scholasticism: A Comparative Study with Focus on the Theories of Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617), Joao Poinsot O.P. (1589-1644), and
Bartolomeo Mastri Da Meldola O.F.M. Conv. (1602-1673), Bonaventura Belluto O.F.M. Conv. (1600-1676). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
"This study aims to present a comparative analysis of philosophical theories of universals espoused by the foremost representatives of the three main schools of early modern
scholastic thought. The book introduces the doctrines of Francisco Suarez, S.J. (1548-1617), the Thomist John of St. Thomas, O.P. (1589-1644), and the Scotists Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola, O.F.M.
Conv. (1602-1673) and Bonaventura Belluto, O.F.M. Conv. (1600-1676). The author examines in detail their mutual doctrinal delineation as well as the conceptualist tenet of the Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de
Mendoza (1578-1641), whose thought constitutes an important systematic point of comparison especially with Suarez's doctrine. The book offers the first comparative elaboration of the issue of
universals, in both its metaphysical and its epistemological aspects, in the era of second scholasticism."
Hellin, José. 1962. "El Concepto Formal En Suárez." Pensamiento no. 18:407-432.
Hill, Benjamin, and Lagerlund, Henrik, eds. 2012. The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez. New York: Oxford University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; List of Contributors VIII; List of Abbreviations IX; Bejamin Hill: Introduction 1; I. Background and Influence. 1. Michael Edwards: Suarez in a Late
Scholastic Context: Anatomy, Psychology and Authority 25; 2. Roger Ariew: Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez: Theory of Distinctions and Principle of Individuation 38; II. Metaphysics. 3.
Christopher Shields: Shadows of Being: Francisco Suárez's Entia Rationis 57; 4. Jorge Secada: Suárez on Continuous Quantity 75; III. Natural Philosophy. 5. Dennis Des Chene: Suárez on
Propinquity and the Efficient Cause 89; 6. Helen Hattab: Suárez's Last Stand for the Substantial Form 101; IV. Mind and Psychology. 7. James B. South: Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence
on the Body 121; 8. Cees Leijenhorst: Suárez on Self-Awareness 137; 9. Marleen Rozemond: Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez's Soul 154; V. Ethics and Natural Law. 10. Thomas Pink: Reason and
Obligation in Suárez 175; 11. James Gordley: Suárez and Natural Law 209; Bibliography 230; index 291.
Hurtado, Guillermo. 1999. "Entes E Modos En La Disputationes Metafísicas." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao E Modernidade, edited by Cardoso, Adelino,
Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 99-117. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri.
Ippolito, Benedetto. 2005. Analogia Dell'essere. La Metafisica Di Suárez Tra onto-Teologia Medievale E Filosofia Moderna. Milano: Franco Angeli.
Iturroz, Jesûs. 1948. "Fuentes De La Metafisica De Suárez." Pensamiento no. 4:31-89.
———. 1949. Estudios Sobre La Metafisica De Francisco Suárez, S.I. Madrid: Ediciones Fax.
Kainz, Howard P. 1970. "The Suárezian Position on Being and the Real Distinction: A Analytic and Comparative Study." Thomist no. 34:289-305.
"In elucidating the relationship between "existence" and "essence", it seems that two fundamental options are open: 1) to ground existence in existence itself; or 2) to ground
existence in nothingness. Thomas Aquinas, in his doctrine on essence as potentiality, chooses the latter option, for all practical purposes. Suárez, in order to avoid grounding existence in
nothingness, chooses the former option. One result of his choice is the purely mental "distinction" between essence and existence."
Karofsky, Amy D. 2001. "Suárez's Doctrine of Eternal Truths." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 39:23-47.
"In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Suárez's doctrine of eternal truths expounded in Metaphysical Disputation XXXI, Chapter XII, Sections 38-47. There, Suárez
considers and rejects several theories before developing his own. Because it is somewhat difficult to determine what view Suárez ultimately adopts, interpretations of this passage tend to vary. I
argue that the interpretations of Norman Wells, Armand Maurer and John P. Doyle are inadequate, since Suárez wants a solution to the problem of eternal truths that does not depend upon the will of
the divine being and one that avoids any ontological commitment to unactualized, possible success."
———. 2001. "Suárez's Influence on Descartes's Theory of Eternal Truths." Medieval Philosophy and Theology no. 10:241-262.
"There is a philosophical problem, what I will call the problem of eternal truths, that can be stated as follows: If an unactualized, possible essence has no being and is, hence,
absolutely nothing, then what grounds the eternal and necessary truth of propositions that purport to be about them? If there were no men, what would ground the necessary truth, "Man is a rational
animal"? And what grounded the truth of that proposition prior to the creation of the world? (If it was in fact true at that moment?)"
Knebel, Sven K. 2011. Suarezismus. Erkenntnistheoretisches Aus Dem Nachlass Des Jesuitengenerals Tirso González De Santalla (1624-1705). Abhandlung Und Edition.
Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner.
Text based on the partial edition of two Latin manuscripts in the Bibliotheca Universitaria de Salamanca: 1) Disputationes in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis et in duo libros
De Generatione et Corruptione and 2) Disputationes in Metaphysicam, et libros De Anima, quibus adiuncti sunt duo ultimi tractatus Logicae De Interpretatione, et de Priori, et Posteriori
Kronen, John. 1991. "Essentialism Old and New: Suárez and Brody." Modern Schoolman:123-151.
"A revived interest in essentialism characterizes much recent Anglo-American philosophy. In this article I compare and contrast one of the most articulate and well-argued recent
versions of essentialism, that of Baruch Brody, with that of the last great system builder of the Schoolmen, Francis Suárez. I argue that Suárez's account of essentialism has advantages over Brody's
because in positing a form that is entitative or thing-like as the chief constituent of the essences of substances Suárez's account is better able to explain the substantial unity of substances."
———. 1997. "Substances Are Not Windowless: A Suárezian Critique of Monadism." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 71:5-81.
"Recently, Thomas Huffman has defended Leibniz's metaphysics of substance. In this paper I offer a critique of that metaphysics from the point of view of the metaphysics of
Leibniz's near contemporary, Francis Suárez. In my critique I show that Suárez's Aristotelianism is better able to account for the existence of composite substances than is Leibniz's metaphysics and
that Leibniz's implicit arguments against the Suárezian account of substance fail. I conclude, based upon this, that Suárez's metaphysics should be preferred to Leibniz's since it better accords with
the common sense notion that things such as humans and cats are true substances and not mere aggregates."
Larrainzar, Carlos. 1977. Una Introducción a Francisco Suárez. Pamplona: EUNSA.
Lejenhorst, Cees. 2007. "Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought." In Forming the Mind Essays on the Internal Senses and
the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 237-262. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"In this paper I have to limit myself to only a few late Aristotelian authors.
I shall deal with Thomas de Vio (Cardinal Cajetan) and Francesco Suarez.
Cajetan was one of the key figues in the rise of the so-called seconda scolastica, the counter-reformational attempt to build a new Christian philosophy that fused
revelation with Aristotelian thought. Moreover, his ideas about sense perception were heavily attacked by Suarez, who is
probably the best known and most influential Jesuit authors, who were so important in shaping late Aristotelianism. In this fashion, our sample of case studies is arguably limited,
but nevertheless quite representative for sixteenth-century Aristotelian accounts of sense perception. By way of conclusion, this article ends with a brief exploration of how the debate on sense
perception and its relation to the metaphysics of the chain of being changed with the advent of modern philosophy, in particular with Descartes." (p. 241)
Lohr, Charles H. 2002. "Possibility and Reality in Suárez's Disputationes Metaphysicae." In Res Et Verba in Der Renaissance. Proceedings of a Colloquium Held at
Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel in 1998, edited by Kessler, Eckhard and Maclean, Ian, 273-286. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
Lombardo, Mario Gaetano. 1995. La Forma Che Dà L'essere Alle Cose. Enti Di Ragione E Bene Trascendentale in Suarez, Leibniz, Kant. Milano: Istituto Propaganda
Lopez, Jesus Garcia. 1969. "La Concepcion Suarista Del Ente Y Sus Implicaciones Metafisicas." Anuario Filosofico no. 2:137-167.
Marion, Jean-Luc. 1996. "A Propos De Suárez Et Descartes." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 50:109-131.
———. 1996. "Substance Et Subsistance. Suárez Et Le Traité De La Substantia Dans Les Principia I, § 51-54." In Questions Cartésiennes Ii, 91-99. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
Italian translation: Sostanza e sussistenza. Suárez e il trattato della substantia nei Principia I, 51-54, in: Jean-Robert Armogathe, Giulia Belgioioso (eds.),
Descartes: Principia Philosophiae (1644-1994), Atti del convegno per il 350° anniversario della pubblicazione dell'opera, Parigi, 5-6 maggio 1994, Lecce 10-12 novembre 1994, Napoli:
"Étude de la conception cartésienne de la substance à la lumière d'un rapprochement avec la définition de la substance comme subsistance chez Suarez. Soulevant le problème de
l'indétermination entre univocité et analogie, selon que le concept concerne le fini ou l'infini, l'Auteur examine le double paradoxe de la définition épistémologique et de la définition ontique de
Martins, Antonio Manuel. 1999. "Tópica Metafísica: De Fonseca À Suárez." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao E Modernidade, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins,
Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 157-168. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri.
Menn, Stephen. 1997. "Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes." In Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery, edited by White, Kevin, 226-256. Washington: Catholic University of
Miner, Robert C. 2001. "Suárez as Founder of Modernity: Reflections on a "Topos" in Recent Historiography." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 18:17-36.
"The aim of this paper is to query a notion that appears with increasing frequency in recent narratives of modern philosophy. The notion is that the secret founder of modernity is
not Bacon, Descartes or Hobbes, but Francisco Suárez. This paper examines three attempts to make the case of Suárez as the founder of modern philosophy and finds each of them deficient. First, I
examine the treatment of Suárez in Etienne Gilson's Being and Some Philosophers. Secondly, I consider Alasdair MacIntyre's characterization of Suárez as an essentially antihistorical thinker
in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Thirdly, I attempt to disambiguate several claims about Suárez that are characteristically bundled together by post-Heideggerian readings of Suárez
as the founder of a new science of ontology. The conclusion is that while it would be premature to reject the possibility that Suárez is the founder of modern philosophy, the precise sense in which
he would fit this description has not been persuasively delineated."
Nadler, Stephen. 1989. Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
On Suárez see: Chapter 18. Objective being in Suá rez and Descartes, pp. 147-165.
Noreña, Carlos G. 1981. "Ockham and Suárez on the Ontological Status of Universal Concepts." New Scholasticism no. 55:348-362.
"Ockham's failure to explain the ontological conditions for the possibility of universal predication partially justifies the traditional view of him as a nominalist. Ockham rejected
the basic aristotelian and Thomistic doctrines about common natures, the principle of individuation and relations. Suárez avoided both the Platonizing realism of Scotus and the nominalistic leanings
of Ockham with his carefully articulated theories on the limitation of the act, the principle of individuation, and the difference between essence and existence. Scholastic thought on the ontological
status of universal concepts centers on issues which are fundamental to the interpretation of Plato and Aristotle and which a comprehensive theory of knowledge cannot avoid."
———. 1983. "Heidegger on Suárez: The 1927 Marburg Lectures." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 23:407-424.
"Heidegger's thought on Suarez has been studied for the most part by scholastic philosophers with a particular doctrinal intent, in the context of Heidegger’s views on the history
of ontology, and on the narrow basis of a few passing remarks in some of Heidegger’s works.(1) The 1975 publication of Heidegger’s (Summer Semester, 1927) lectures on Die Grundprobleme der
Phänomenologie, and their recent translation into English by Professor Hofstadter, make possible a better documented and more conclusive analysis of the subject.(2) Unfortunately, other relevant
sources still remain unpublished, such as Heidegger’s lectures and seminars on the history of philosophy from St. Thomas to Kant, medieval mysticism, St. Augustine, and Renaissance scholasticism. All
of them, however, give a clear indication of Brentano’s influence upon Heidegger’s early thought and demonstrate an interest in medieval philosophy which one seldom finds among contemporary thinkers.
In this essay we intend 1) to summarize Heidegger’s views on medieval scholastic philosophy in general and those of Suärez in particular, and(2) attempt to retrieve from the Marburg lectures what
Heidegger left unsaid and unthought on the scholastic distinction between essence and existence." (p. 407)
(1) Some scholars have argued that Heidegger’s criticism of medieval ontology was fully justified when directed against Suárez, but radically unfair to St. Thomas. To this group
belong: G. Siewerth, Das Schicksal der Metaphysik vom Thomas zu Heidegger (Einsideln, 1959); R. Echauri, Heidegger y la Metafísica Tomista (Buenos Aires, 1970); B. Rioux, L'être
et la vérité chez Heidegger et Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Montreal-Paris. 1963); C. Fabro, Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin (Louvain. 1961); J. P. Doyle, “Heidegger and
Scholastic Metaphysics," The Modem Schoolman, 49 (1972), 201-221; O. N. Derisi, “Approximaciones y diferencias entre la fenomenología existencialista de Martin Heidegger y la ontología de
Santo Tomás,” Sapientia, 22 (1967), 185-192; W. R. Korn, “La question de l'être chez Martin Heidegger," Revue Thomiste, 71 (1971), 33-58.
More favorable toSuárez were H. Meyer, Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin (Munich, 1968); and M. Schneider, “Der angebliche Essentialismus des Suarez,” Wissenschaft und
Weisheit, 24 (1961), 40-68.
Finally, there are those philosophers who think that both St. Thomas and Suárez fully deserve Heidegger's criticism. See. e.g., H. Siegfried, Die Warhrheit und Metaphysik bei
Suárez (Bonn. 1967).
Heidegger’s references to Suárez can be found in Sein und Zeit ( Gesamtausgabe, ed. by F. W. von Herrmann, vol. 2, Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 30; Die Frage nach
dem Ding (Tübingen, 1962). 77; and Nietzsche (Pfullingcn, 1961), II, 418.
(2) The lectures Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (henceforth GP) were published in 1975 as vol. 24 of the Gesamtausgabe. They were reviewed by M. E. Zimmermann in
the International Philosophical Quarterly, 17 (1977), 235-237. and in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 39 (1979). 537-550. Professor A. Hofstadter’s excellent translation
was published in 1981 by Indiana University Press under the title Basic Problems of Phenomenology (henceforth BP). I want to thank both Indiana U. Press and Professor Hofstadter for their kind
permission to quote the English translation.
———. 1985. "Suárez and Spinoza: The Metaphysics of Modal Being." Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 12:163-182.
Novák, Lukáš, ed. 2014. Suárez’s Metaphysics in Its Historical and Systematic Context. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Table of Contents: Lukáš Novák: Regaining the Context for Suárez: An Introduction to the Volume 1-7; Note on Editorial Policies. List of Abbreviations 8-10; Part One. General
Metaphysics 11; Marco Forlivesi: In Search of the Roots of Suárez's Conception of Metaphysics: Aquinas, Bonino, Hervaeus Natalis, Orbellis, Trombetta 13-37; Rolf Darge: Zum historischen Hintergrund
der Transzendentalienlehre in den Disputationes metaphysicae 39-62; Giannina Burlando: Suárez on Translatio vocis 'Veritas' 63-86; Victor Salas: Francisco Suárez, the Analogy of Being, and
its Tensions 87-104; Marko J. Fuchs: Univozität und Distinktion Metaphysische Grundstrukturen bei Duns Scotus, Suárez, Descartes und Spinoza 105-116; Costantino Esposito: The Hidden Influence of
Suárez on Kant's Transcendental Conception of 'Being', 'Essence', and 'Existence 117-134; Marco Lamanna: Ontology between Goclenius and Suárez; 135-151; Jorge Uscatescu Barrón: Das Gedankending und
der Gegenstant der Metaphysik: Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Analogie zwischen dem Realen Seienden und dem ens rationis in den Disputationes metaphysicae des Suárez 153-181; Daniel D.
Novotný: The Historical Non-Significance of Suárez's Theory of Beings of Reason: A Lesson from Hurtado 183-208; Parto Two. Speical Themes 209; Jorge Secada: Suárez's Nominalist Master Argument:
Metaphysical Disputations 5, 1 211-236; Saverio Di Liso: The Efficient Cause in Domingo de Soto 237-257; Simo Knuuttila: The Connexions between Vital Acts in Suárez's Psychology' 259-274;
Anna Tropia: Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy: The Necessity of the "connexio potentiarum" in the Present State 275-292; Stephan Schmid: Suárez and the Problem of Final Causation 293-308; Robert
Fastiggi: Suárez in Relation to Anselm, Aquinas and Scotus on Proving God's Existence 309-323; Author Profiles 325-328; About the Editor 329-330; General Index 331-344; Index of Persons 345-348;
Index of Greek Terms 348.
Novotný, Daniel D. 2013. Ens Rationis from Suárez to Caramuel. A Study in Scholasticism of the Baroque Era. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Beings of reason are impossible intentional objects, such as blindness and square-circle. The first part of this book is structured around a close reading of Suarez's main text on
the subject, namely Disputation 54. The second part centers on texts on this topic by other outstanding philosophers of the time, such as the Spanish Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza
(1578-1641), the Italian Franciscan Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-73), and the Spanish-Bohemian-Luxembourgian polymath Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz (1606-82)."
Olivo, Gilles. 1993. "L'homme En Personne. Descartes, Suarez, Et La Question De L' ens Per Se." In Descartes Et Regius. Autour De L'explication De L'esprit
Humain, edited by Verbeek, Theo, 69-91. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
———. 1995. "L'impossibilité De La Puissance: Les Conditions De La Pensée De L'individu Chez Suarez." In L'individu Dans La Pensée Moderne Xvie-Xviiie Siècles / L'individuo
Nel Pensiero Moderno. Secoli Xvi-Xviii, edited by Cazzaniga, Gian Mario and Zarka, Yves Charles. Firenze: ETS.
Owens, Joseph. 1957. "The Number of Terms in the Suárezian Discussion on Essence and Being." Modern Schoolman no. 34:147-191.
Peccorini, Francisco. 1972. "Suárez's Struggle with the Problem of the One and the Many." Thomist no. 36:433-471.
"The purpose of this article is to find out whether Suárez's attempt to reconcile analogy with the thesis of the perfect unity of the concept of 'ens' was successful. To this
effect, Suárez's basic premises - his theory of the universals and his conception of existence as such - are discussed. The former is dismissed on the grounds that in it the would be link between
conceptualism and realism is no link at all because it rests only on an inductive abstraction which in turn is unworkable inasmuch as it is incompatible with the basic Suárezian tenet that the first
direct concept is of the individual only. It is shown also how Suárez nullifies his claims of analogy by accounting for the genesis of his concept of 'ens' in terms of his theory of the universals
which necessarily opens up to a univocal format. Finally, the article tackles the second premise - Suárez's conception of existence as such understood as a thing and points to its equivocating effect
on the concept of 'ens'."
———. 1974. "Knowledge of the Singular: Aquinas, Suárez, and Recent Interpreters." Thomist no. 38 (606):655.
"Given the decisive influence of Suárez's conception on modern and contemporary nominalism, a thorough criticism is carried out on different levels: (1) through a 'prima facie'
logical analysis of his arguments; (2) through an exhaustive criticism of José M. Alejandro's interpretation of Suárez's position, which is bent upon updating his mentor's foundation; and finally (3)
on the basis of an ' ad hominem' dialogue centered on Suárez's Thomistic claims. It is the contention of this article that through his eclectic solution Suárez jeopardized both the nature of
the agent intellect -- by hollowing out its whole ontological value -- and the thesis of the primacy of the individual in epistemology -- by leaving our knowledge unexplained in its most fundamental
respects and providing it only with unrealistic grounds. This makes it incumbent upon the author to show that the Thomistic thesis of indirect knowledge of the singular proves to be fully
satisfactory if examined in the light of Bernard J Lonergan and Karl Rahner's writings."
Pereira, José. 1996. "John of St. Thomas and Suárez." Acta Philosophica no. 5:115-136.
"Classical Thomism, originated by Aquinas, developed by Cajetan and consummated by John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), had many critics, chief among them Francisco Suárez, the prime
thinker of Baroque Scholasticism. His critique initiated changes in Thomism, leading John, among other Thomists, to abandon the commentarial method followed by the older Scholastics; to occasionally
substitute the Suárezian metaphysical distinction for the real distinction characteristic of Thomism; to concede that the foundational Thomist tenet of the limitation of existence by essence is
debatable; and to accept Suárez's definition of God as "ipsum intelligere subsistens" rather than as "ipsum esse subsistens". "
———. 1999. "The Achievement of Suárez and the Suarezanisation of Thomism." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao E Modernidade, edited by Cardoso, Adelino, Martins,
Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 133-156. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri.
———. 2004. "The Existential Integralism of Suárez, Reevaluation of Gilson's Allegation of Suárezian Essentialism." Gregorianum no. 85:660-688.
"In declaring that 'existence as existence corresponds to being as such, and pertains to its intrinsic significance', Suárez accords to existence a preeminence perhaps not ascribed
to it by any Scholastic philosopher. Conceptually distinct, existence and essence are really identical, their identity indicated by the term essentia realis, or 'existent essence'. Being
( ens) is at once unitary in meaning and dyadic; it denotes existence that is both actual ( ens ut participium) and aptitudinal ( ens ut nomen). 'Actual' existence is realized
extra-mentally, while the 'aptitudinal' is existence insofar it is intelligible to the mind, prescinding from but not denying any extra-mental realization. The terminology that Suárez employs is
distinctly his own. Gilson, however, reads him Thomistically, and so interprets his essentia realis as a kind of Thomist reified concept affirming the preeminence of essence. More recent
commentators, influenced by Heidegger, see in the Suarezian essentia realis no more than cogitabilitas."
———. 2007. Suarez. Between Scholasticism and Modernity. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Pérez San Martin, Héctor. 1999. "Determinación Del Objeto Y Estudio De La Metafísica, Sus Límites Y Su Correlato Con El Nombre De Esta Ciencia Según El Pensamiento Del P.
Francisco Suárez." Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 26:5-39.
Rinaldi, Teresa. 1998. Francisco Suarez. Cognitio Singularis Materialis: De Anima. Bari: Levante.
Riva, Franco. 1979. "La Dottrina Suáreziana Del Concetto E Le Sue Fonti Storiche." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 71:686-699.
"Suárez's doctrine of concept while historically accepting the contribution of the mayor philosophical traditions of Middle Ages, has its own originality as it proceeds from the
metaphysical fundamental, i.e., from the constant reference to the doctrine of power and act which is only typical of Suárez. Theoretically, Suárez (whom Descartes read at La Flèche) definitely
reaffirms the intention of knowledge supporting the form of immediate realism. Beyond any gnosiological dualism he demonstrates by exclusion the identity of verbum and high intellective and
proposes (differing in opinion with Thomas Aquinas) to define "the concept of id quo res concipitur", reducing it to pure instrument or mere sign, the reality of which all lies in the
Robinet, André. 1980. "Suárez Dans L'œuvre De Leibniz." Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia no. 7:191-209.
"Statistiquement, Suárez est l'un des auteurs les moins cités par Leibniz (quatorze mentions). Aucune étude directe ne lui est consacrée dans les manuscrits connus. Les références
de Leibniz a Suárez sont étudiées autour de sept concepts (métaphysique, principe d'individuation, causalité, harmonie préetablie, de vinculo substantiale, eucharistie, scientia
media) une étude comparative "fondée en realité textuelle" devient alors édifiable."
Roig Gironella, Juan. 1948. "La Síntesis Metafìsica De Suárez." Pensamiento no. 4:169-213.
———. 1987. "La Analogía Del Ser En Suárez." Espíritu Cuadernos del Instituto Filosófico de Balmesiana no. 36:5-48.
Ross, James F. 1962. "Suárez on "Universals"." Journal of Philosophy no. 59:736-747.
"This is an exposition of Francis Suárez's treatment of the following two questions: (1) what sort of "community" obtains among things that are properly said to be of the same sort?
(2) in what sense can any "reality" be correctly called universal? The paper explains Suárez's claims that there are real universals and that there is fundamentally but not formally a real community
in reality. The pivotal problem is seen to concern the meaning of 'similarity', since it does "not" mean having something in common. The paper offers the only resolution of the problem reconcilable
with Suárez's own statements, indicating that it commits him to a very novel (in his time) form of conceptualism."
Salas, Victor M., and Fastiggi, Robert L., eds. 2015. A Companion to Francisco Suárez. Leiden: Brill.
Table of contents: Preface; Victor Salas and Robert Fastiggi: Introduction: Francisco Suárez, the Man and His Work 1-28; Jean-Paul Coujou: Political Thought and Legal Theory in
Suárez 29-71; Jean-François Courtine: Suárez, Heidegger, and Contemporary Metaphysics 72-90; Rolf Darge: Suárez on the Subject of Metaphysics 91-123; Costantino Esposito: Suárez and the Baroque
Matrix of Modern Thought 124-147; Robert Fastiggi: Francisco Suárez as Dogmatic Theologian 148-163; Daniel Heider: Suárez on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Universals 164-191; Simo Knuuttila:
Suárez’s Psychology 192-220; John Kronen: Suárez’s Influence on Protestant Scholasticism: The Cases of Hollaz and Turretín 221-247; Daniel Novotný: Suárez on Beings of Reason 248-273; Paul Pace:
Suárez and the Natural Law 274-296; Joseé Pereira: Original Features of Suárez’s Thought 297-312; Michael Renemann: Suárez’s Doctrine of Concepts: How Divine and Human Intellection are Intertwined
313-335; Victor Salas: Between Thomism and Scotism: Francisco Suárez on the Analogy of Being 336-362; Epilogue; List of Contributors; Bibliography; Index of Names; Index Rerum.
Sanz, Victor. 1989. La Teoría De La Posibilidad En Francisco Suárez. Pamplona: EUNSA.
———. 1992. "La Reducción Suáreciana De Los Transcendentales." Anuario Filosofico no. 25:403-420.
"The notion of aliquid and res, excluded by Suárez from the transcendentals, nevertheless are of primary importance in the understanding of the notion of being, a
key aspect of suárecian ontology."
Schmutz, Jacob. 2002. "Un Dieu Indifférent. La Crise De La Science Divine Dans La Scolastique Moderne." In Le Contemplateur Et Les Idées. Modèles De La Science Divine Du
Néoplatonisme Aux Temps Modernes, edited by Boulnois, Olivier, Schmutz, Jacob and Solère, Jean-Luc, 185-221. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2004. "¿Abatir O Ensalzar a Francisco Suárez?" In Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof.
Salvador Castellote, 5-16. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.
Preface to the volume.
———. 2004. "Science Divine Et Métaphysique Chez Francisco Suárez." In Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje
Al Prof. Salvador Castellote, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 347-379. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.
———, ed. 2004. Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der Mann". Apéndice: Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote. Valencia: Facultad
de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.
Schöndorf, Harald. 2004. "La Nada Real. La Doctrina De Los Entes Posibles En La Disuputaciones Metafísicas De Fracisco Suárez." In Francisco Suárez. "Der Ist Der
Mann". Apéndice Francisco Suárez De Generatione Et Corruptione. Homenaje Al Prof. Salvador Castellote, edited by Schmutz, Jacob, 381-403. Valencia: Facultad de Teología San Vicente Ferrer.
Schwartz, Daniel, ed. 2012. Interpreting Suárez. Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Notes on Contributors VII-VIII; Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations and method of citation IX; 1. Daniel Schwartz: Introduction 1; 2. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Daniel D.
Novotný: Fundamentals in Suárez's metaphysics: transcendentals and categories 19; 3. Christopher Shields: The reality of substantial form: Suárez, Metaphysical disputations XV 39; 4. Jorge
Secada: Suárez on the ontology of relations 62; 5. Bernie Cantens: Suárez's cosmological argument for the existence of God 82; 6. Thomas Pink: Action and freedom in Suárez's ethics 115; 7. Terence H.
Irwin: Obligation, rightness, and natural law: Suárez and some critics 142; 8.Daniel Schwartz: Suárez on distributive justice 163; 9. Gregory M. Reichberg: Suárez on just war 185; Bibliography 205;
Seigfried, Hans. 1972. "Kant's Thesis About Being Anticipated by Suárez?" In Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, edited by Beck, Lewis White, 510-520.
"The paper attempts to clarify a notion in Kant's philosophy which is much discussed today, by referring back to the doctrine of Suárez, an historically influential representative
of traditional ontology. It tries to give a rational account of the Suárezian doctrine of possibility and reality by making explicit those assumptions which make it comprehensible and which were
still, after some important modifications, the presuppositions underlying Kant's thesis that being is obviously not a real predicate or (a predicate which stands for) something real but merely the
positing of a thing."
Sgarbi, Marco, ed. 2010. Francisco Suárez and His Legacy. The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
Table of Contents: Preface 5; Victor Salas: Francisco Suárez: End of the Scholastic epistéme? 9; Salvador Castellote: El ‘túnel del tiempo’. Tiempo, movimiento y su medida,
la teoría de los puntos y la indivisibilidad, según Suárez 29; Marco Forlivesi: Francisco Suárez and the rationes studiorum of the Society of Jesus 77; Anna Tropia: Suárez as a Scotist. The Portrait
of the Doctor Eximius in Losada’s Commentary on the Soul 91; Daniel Heider: Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza’s (Mis)interpretation of Aquinas 105; Marco Lamanna: Tra Fonseca e Suárez. L’ingresso della
nozione di ens reale nella Schulmetaphysik 141; Igor Agostini: Suárez, Descartes e la dimostrazione dell’esistenza di Dio 169; Stefano Di Bella: Tota sua entitate. Suárez
and Leibniz on Individuation 205; Marco Sgarbi: Francisco Suárez and Christian Wolff. A Missed Intellectual Legacy 227; Valerio Rocco Lozano: L’eredità nascosta di Suárez nel sistema hegeliano 243;
Jacopo-Niccolè Bonato: Le occorrenze di Suárez nell’opera di Brentano 261; Federico Baccaccini: Quasi umbrae entium. Suárez e Brentano sull’ ens rationis 271-294.
Siewerth, Gustav. 1959. Das Schiksal Der Metaphysik Von Thomas Zu Heidegger. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag.
Reprinted in G. Siewerth, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, Düsseldorf, Patmos, 1987.
See Chapter IX: Die Objektivierung ders Denkens, pp. 19-37.
South, James B. 2001. "Francisco Suárez on Imagination." Vivarium no. 39:119-158.
"I discuss two themes in Suárez's account of internal sensation: the number of internal sense powers and the activities of the internal sense. I show that Suárez rejects a plurality
of internal sense powers arguing that there need be only one such power. I then explore his account of the act of internal sensation showing its relation to both external sensation and intellectual
knowledge. Most notably, I show why Suárez was compelled to posit an "agent internal sense" and how he manages to remain consistent with his view that there is only one internal sense power."
———. 2001. "Suárez and the Problem of External Sensation." Medieval Philosophy and Theology no. 10:217-240.
Specht, Rainer. 1997. "Aspects 'Cartésiens' De La Théorie Suarezienne De La Matière." In Lire Descartes Aujourd'hui, edited by Sepré, Olivier and Lories, Danielle,
21-45. Louvain: Peeters.
Svoboda, David. 2007. "Francisco Suárez on the Addition of the One to Being and the Priority of the One over the Many." Studia Neoaristotelica no. 4:158-172.
"Suárez's solution to the problem of the conceptual Addition of the One to being follows firstly the Aristotelian-Averroistic tradition mediated by Aquinas. According to this
tradition, the One adds to being only a negative determination. Suárez claims that the One does not signify any positive perfection either really or conceptually distinct from being as such. Suárez's
own solution to the problem is presented in a critical discussion with many different conceptions, but Suárez pays most attention to the theory of certain, mainly Franciscan, authors who hold that
the One adds to being a positive perfection which is only conceptually distinct from being as such. The main argument for this thesis is based on the assumption that indivision is to be taken as a
double negation, by which an affirmation is expressed. This concept of indivision was, according to Suárez, also defended by Aquinas, who holds that the negation which is expressed by the One negates
the division of one being from another. Suárez rejects this solution and proposes his own conception, according to which the One does not negate the negative moment of the division of one being from
another, but the positive moment of an essential division of a being in itself. The One thus negates a real positive division of being in itself. On the basis of this theory, Suárez further rejected
Aquinas's (and the Thomistic) conception of a conceptual priority of the One over the Many, which was put forth as an answer to the old Aristotelian problem of a privative opposition between the One
and the Many. Suárez defends the real priority of an indivision over a division as well as a real and conceptual priority of the One over the Many. Suárez's conception seems to us to be compatible
with his concept of a negative Addition of the One to being. "
Teixeira, António Braz. 1999. "Suárez E O Objecto E a Naturaleza Da Metafísica." In Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). Tradiçao E Modernidade, edited by Cardoso, Adelino,
Martins, Antonio Manuel and Dos Santos, Leonel Ribeiro, 37-44. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri.
Thompson, Augustine. 1995. "Francisco Suarez's Theory of Analogy and the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas." Angelicum no. 72:353-362.
Uscatescu Barron, Jorge. 1995. "El Concepto De Metafisica En Suarez: Su Objeto Y Dominio." Pensamiento no. 51:215-236.
"Se trata de una interpretacion de la Primera Disputacion de las Disputationes metaphysicae de Suarez. El objeto de la metafisica es el ser real en general con exclusion
del ente de razon y del ente per accidens. Asi pues, el dominio de la metafisica es la totalidad de los entes reales por si. A continuacion se estudia cada uno de los temas que la metafisica
debe tratar, lo cual se refleja en la estructura de la mencionada obra de Suarez: propiedades y principios del ser, etc. Al hacer de la inmaterialidad un rasgo del ser se desvirtua el caracter
generalisimo de la metafisica, que de por si esta mas alla de la division del ser material e inmaterial. Por ultimo, se analiza la correspondencia entre los rasgos entresacados de la metafisica como
ciencia y el ser real en general."
Vleeschauwer, Herman Jean de. 1949. "Un Paralelo Protestante a La Obra De Suárez." Revista de Filosofia no. 8:365-400.
Volpi, Franco. 1993. "Suárez Et Le Problème De La Métaphysique." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 98:395-411.
"L'article attire l'attention sur l'importance du "tournant" Suárezien dans l'historie de la métaphysique conçue comme onto - théo - logie, mettant en lumière les decisions
qui sont prises par Suárez par rapport aux "topoi" les plus importants de la pensée scolastique et de la pensée moderne. L'éxtraordinaire fortune de Suárez s'explique par le fait qu'il n'est pas
seulement le dernier scolastique, mais aussi le premier moderne."
Wells, Norman J. 1955. The Distinction of Essence and Existence in the Philosophy of Francis Suárez.
Ph.D thesis submitted to the University of Toronto.
Abstract: "The name of Francis Suárez is a famous one in the history of philosophy, not to mention the histories of theology and law. Indeed, his position on the question of the
distinction between essence and existence in creatures, the subject matter of this thesis, is especially notorious. However, though his final position on this question is quite well known, the
philosophical milieu surrounding that decision and undoubtedly influencing it, is, in contrast, rather obscure. This dissertation is primarily concerned with the latter aspect of the problem.
Suarez himself is our best guide since he lists the three famous traditions on this question up to his day and cites men and arguments on behalf of each. The first tradition, that
of the "Thomists", is the real distinction which maintains, for Suarez, that the essence and existence of a creature are really distinct as duae res or two beings, and mutually separable, each being
able to exist apart from the other. The second tradition, that of the modal distinction, also holds for a similar real distinction in creatures as between a res or a being and its mode which are not
mutually separable. The third tradition, the distinction of reason and the position of Suárez, rejects any kind of real distinction of essence and existence in a creature and affirms a distinction
which is the work of the intellect and is not at all present in the thing.
Research into the sources of the five arguments Suárez attributes to the "Thomists" he lists has found that the first two are explicit in such "Thomists" as Giles of Rome, John
Capreolus, Paulus Barbus Soncinas, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara and Chrysostomus Javellus. The other three arguments are not found in the texts of these men noted by Suárez. But the common
denominator of all the arguments is that they affirm a real distinction between an uncreated esse essentiae or essence and a created esse existentiae or existence. That is, for Suarez, these men
distinguish what comes to be by an efficient cause, namely, existence, and what does not come to be by an efficient cause, namely, essence. Thus Suárez sees that the "Thomist" school undergoes the
doctrinal influence of Avicenna and this Neo-Platonic tradition through St. Albert, Henry of Ghent, and possibly Meister Eckhart.
On behalf of the second tradition, Suarez cites some texts of John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Dominicus Soto which purportedly support this modal distinction. In this
tradition, esse existentiae, according to Suarez, is a mode which is a positive existential entity in his own right as in the first tradition. However, unlike the latter, it cannot endure apart from
the essence of which it is the mode. Thus, the second tradition differs from the first, not so much on the notion of essence which is the same, but on the degree of reality each will attribute to
esse existentiae. Of interest is the fact that no such position is found in the texts of Scotus and Henry of Ghent. The texts of Soto do contain a doctrine of esse existentiae as a mode of essence
but do not describe it as a positive existential reality.
The third tradition is manifested in the texts of the sixteen men cited by Suarez as its exponents although there is a variety of formulation as to the type of distinction of reason
in question. However, this tradition is one in interpreting the real distinctions of the first two traditions to be between duae res or a res and its mode. It is also one in rejecting these two
traditions. Moreover, this third tradition is one in holding that the essence and existence in question is the actual existing essence and esse in actu exercito. It is between these that there is
only a distinction of reason. However, these men agree that the essence abstractly conceived or essence as possible is distinguished from actual existence or actual essence as non-being from being.
The basic reason for their rejection of a real distinction is that something cannot be intrinsically constituted in the existential order by something really distinct from it. For each is a being in
its own right as distinct from the other. More basic than this is the fact that there is no esse existentiae in addition to the esse essentiae of a creature. Existence means nothing more than the
actual existing essence and in no way signifies an existential actus essendi nor any accidental accretion. The men of this third tradition are characterized for Suarez by the fact that they are all
opponents to some extent of any kind of a Platonic realism within being which is the most manifest feature of the first two traditions on this question.
In explaining the principles behind this third tradition Suarez first lakes steps to remove any autonomous essential actuality apart from the divine intellect since he sees very
clearly that the first two traditions follow from their doctrine of the divine ideas. For them, the divine ideas are the essences of creatures endowed with an esse essentiae in themselves as in Henry
of Ghent. In Suarez' eyes this looks too much like the divine ideas enjoying some eternal existential status apart from God or that they have been created from eternity. As his first principle, and
that of the third tradition, Suarez maintains that the essences of creatures, prior to their creation, are absolutely nothing in the sense of enjoying no real existential status. Though a critic of
this Avicennian tradition on the divine ideas, Suarez still remains within that tradition since he endows the essences of creatures in the divine intellect with an esse possibile, an esse objectivum
or an esse cognitum in much the same fashion as Duns Scotus in his critique of Henry of Ghent and as Durandus in his critique of the same doctrine. Thus, in his critique of any Platonic realism of
essence Suarez remains within the tradition of Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent but much farther along that doctrinal curve which leads to the nominalism of Ockham. Suarez, in his second principle,
carries his critique of any realism of essence into the created order of existing things. For, this principle states that ens in potentia and ens in actu are immediately distinguished as non-being
and being. In this Suarez counters those who maintained that ens in potentia or essence enjoys some positive mode of being, though diminished, within the existent creature and his critique follows
the pattern of the defense of his first principle.
Suarez' criticisms even carry within the tradition on the distinction of reason, rejecting all except the one which enables him to deny that existence is of the essence of the
creature. He finds this feature in what he calls a distinction of the reasoned reason -- a distinction of reason with a foundation in reality. Because a creature has been created or is contingent it
can cease to be and can found a concept of itself as non-existent. This concept of a creature prescinded from existence outside its causes but apt to exist, unlike a chimera, is signified by essentia
for Suarez. The same concept of that creature as existing and outside its causes is signified by existentia. Existentia is denied of essentia creaturae because the concept of the possible essence
does not explicitly include what is signified by existentia or is included in the concept of the actual essence. In a word, the possible essence and the actual essence are mentally distinguished and
the concept of the actual essence as possible and the concept of the same essence as actual are likewise so distinguished. Thus Suarez' distinction of reason is a result of a comparison between two
concepts or rather, different degrees of contraction or adequation of one concept with respect to the actual existing essence, the one more confused and obscure and less contracted than the other. It
is just such a distinction which enables Suarez lo deny existcntia of essentia creaturae. Hence, this distinction between essence and existence is said to be in the existent thing and founded on it
by extrinsic denomination from the concepts of this one existent essence.
By way of this extrinsic denomination Suarez can maintain that the existent essence has some internal metaphysical structure of essence and existence. For, on the basis of the two
concepts of essence and existence and their degrees of adequation 10 the existent essence, the concept of existence is said to contract and be contracted by the concept of essence. In this way
existence is said to be added to essence. This conceptual structure of the contracted and the contracting is then imposed on the actual essence by extrinsic denomination from these concepts. Thus the
constant insistence of Suarez on the intrinsic constitution of the actual essence by existence does not imply any metaphysical structure within the actual existent but is a conceptual structure
imposed on this existent. Versus an order of essence within being uarez offers an order of a radically contingent essence which is being itself, impervious to any existential co principle as it is to
any distinction within it. In this struggle against the Platonic realism of essence in the first two traditions, being, in the hands of Suarez, has lost its metaphysical dimension to the extent it
has become an impenetrable, impervious, indistinct essence. Reality is only metaphysical by extrinsic denomination and the science of metaphysics itself becomes nothing more than an analysis of
———. 1957. "The Number of Terms in the Suárezian Discussion on Essence and Being." Modern Schoolman no. 34:147-191.
———. 1962. "Suárez, Historian and Critic of the Modal Distinction between Essential Being and Existential Being." New Scholasticism no. 36:419-444.
———. 1979. "Old Bottles and New Wine: A Rejoinder to J. C. Doig." New Scholasticism no. 53:515-523.
"This paper is a criticism of an article in the same journal by J. C. Doig, Suárez, Descartes and the objective reality of ideas. On the basis of primary and secondary
source materials, it is made clear that Doig's exclusively extramental interpretation of Suárez's objective concept is insensitive to the obvious intramental dimensions of that teaching. Thus Doig's
claim of a doctrinal discontinuity between Suárez and Descartes is found wanting due to a failure to consider Suárez's position on the realism of the possibles, their role in scientific knowledge in
general, and the part they play in metaphysics."
———. 1981. "Suárez on the Eternal Truths (Part I)." Modern Schoolman no. 58:73-106.
———. 1981. "Suárez on the Eternal Truths (Part Ii)." Modern Schoolman no. 58:159-174.
———. 1984. "Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and Suárez." Journal of Philosophy no. 22:25-50.
———. 1990. "Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Suárez." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 28:33-61.
———. 1993. ""Esse Cognitum" and Suárez Revisited." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 67:339-348.
"The purpose of the work is to clarify the ambiguous use, in Suárez, of the terms " esse cognitum/esse objectivium" so that no charge of "mentalism" can be brought while, at
the same time, it can be acknowledged that " res" enjoys an intramental mode of using, i.e., "objectively" (" conceptus objectivus") as well as an intramental "normal" mode of being
(" conceptus formulis")."
———. 1994. "Javelli and Suárez on the Eternal Truths." Modern Schoolman no. 72:13-35.
"An examination of Suárez's position on the Eternal Truths by bringing to bear upon it a controversy between Chrysostomus Javelli, O. P. (+1538) (who is defending Harvey Nedellec,
a.k.a. Hervaeus Natalis, O. P. (+1323) and Paulus Barbus Soncinas, O. P. (+1494) on the issue of efficient causality with respect to necessary essential propositions and the distinction between a
non-existential use of the copula "est" vs an existential use thereof."
———. 1994. "John Poinsot on Created Eternal Truths Vs Vasquez, Suárez and Descartes." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 68:425-446.
"An examination of John Poinsot's discussion of created eternal truths wherein he criticizes Gabriel Vasquez's interpretation of Aquinas' position on the eternal truths. What is
taken to task is Vasquez's insistence upon a positive eternal aptitudinal truth on the part of necessary as well as contingent truths with regard to creatures. This is such that these truths are not
eternal because known by God's eternal intellect. Rather, they are eternally true (aptitudinally) in themselves apart from the divine intellect. Linkage to Suárez's and Descartes' positions on
created eternal truths is also considered."
———. 1994. "Objective Reality of Ideas in Arnauld, Descartes, and Suárez." In The Great Arnauld and Some of His Philosophical Correspondents, edited by Kremer, Elmer J.,
138-163. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
———. 1998. "Descartes and Suárez on Secondary Qualities: A Tale of Two Readings." Review of Metaphysics no. 51:565-604.
Yela Utrilla, Juan F. 1948. "El Ente De Razón En Suárez." Pensamiento no. 4:271-303.
Zubimendi Martínez, Julián. 1984. "La Teoría De Las Distincciones De Suárez Y Descartes." Pensamiento no. 40:179-202.