Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1979. "The Buddhist Theory of Relation between Prama and Pramana." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 7:43-78.
"The article seeks to introduce Dharmakirti's theory of identity between Prama and Pramana, i.e., valid knowledge and its means. Knowing is nothing but feeling an object-shape
stamped upon knowledge. This cognitive object-stamp is the immediate means to knowledge, being the direct measure of its object and as such is not really different from the structure of knowledge
itself. The difference is thus only an analytical abstraction having no causal import. Many other systems, even Kumarila Mimansa, on close examination, are reduced to the same position, barring the
Nyaya which firmly holds the difference."
Bharadwaja, Vijay K. 1984. "Rationality, Argumentation and Embarrassment: A Study of Four Logical Alternatives ( Catuskoti) in Buddhist Logic." Philosophy East and
West no. 34 (3):303-319.
Bugault, Guy. 1983. "Logic and Dialectics in the "Madhyamakakarikas"." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 11:7-76.
Cheng, Hsueh-li. 1984. Empty Logic: Madhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources. New York: Philosophical Library.
Reprinted: New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1991.
Chi, Richard S.Y. 1969. Buddhist Formal Logic. London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
Part I. A study of Dignaga's Hetucakra and K'uei-chi's Great commentary on the Nyayapraveda.
Reprinted Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984; contains "A Bibliography of Indian and Buddhist Logic" pp. 181-222.
———. 1974. "Topics on Being and Logical Reasoning." Philosophy East and West no. 24 (3):293-300.
———. 1976. "A Semantic Study of Propositions, East and West." Philosophy East and West no. 26 (2):211-223.
———. 1984. "Buddhist Logic and Western Thought." In Buddhism and American Thinkers, edited by Inada, Kennet K. and Jacobson, Nolan P., 111-119. Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Chinchore, Mangala. 1987. "Some Thoughts on Significant Contributions to Buddhist Logicians." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:155-171.
"The paper attempts to show that the difference between "Nyaya" and Buddhism is not merely verbal, but has varied philosophical implications, due to which Nyaya-Buddhist controversy
occupies a very important position in the history of indian philosophical thought. This is vindicated with reference to some of the important and significant issues, viz. "sahtana" (the doctrine of
universal flux), "anityata/ksanikata" (the doctrine of impermanence), and "vyapti (avinabhava-niyama)", which indicate marked differences between them in the field of metaphysics, epistemology, and
Conze, Edward. 1953. "The Ontology of the Prajnaparamita." Philosophy East and West no. 3 (2):117-129.
———. 1963. "Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels." Philosophy East and West no. 13 (1):9-23.
———. 1963. "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 13 (2):105-115.
Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1975. "On Logic and Algebraic and Geometric Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 25 (3):357-364.
———. 1975. "Remarks on Early Buddhist Protoformalism (Logic) and Mr. Tachikawa's Translation of the "Nyayapravesa"." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 3:383-398.
"I discuss some important logical points of translation concerning seven Sanskrit metalogical terms ( paksa, hetu, drstanta, rupya, viruddha, viruddhavyabhicari and
ubhayatravyabhicara), and some proto-formal theories in light of the probable theoretical formalistic expectations of non-specialists in Buddhist logic, e.g., non-formal criteria in the
evaluation rules for determining the legitimacy (not validity) of inference schemas. Additional comments are made on the developmental stages and proto-formalized virtues and limitations of this
early Pramana Yada text."
———. 1977. "Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Inscription of Buddhist Logic ( Nyaya)." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 28 (2):221-231.
———. 1979. "Empirical Falsifiability and the Frequence of Dar'sana Relevance in the Sixth Century Buddhist Logic of Sankaravamin." Logique et Analyse no. 86.
———. 1979. "Metalogical Clichés (Proto-Variables) and Their Restricted Substitution in Sixth Century Buddhist Logic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 20:549-558.
"This paper answers the question: are there variables in early Buddhist logic (Nyaya)? Thus the article describes 1) the implicit rules and sources for the correct substitution of
6th century Buddhist metalogical clichés (proto-variables), 2) some differences between such clichés and modern variables, 3) various metalogical theories and the crucial function of metaphysical
presuppositions, and 4) offers a translation into the first order predicate calculus."
———. 1981. "Aspects of the Indian and Western Traditions of Formal Logic and Their Comparisons." In Buddhist and Western Philosophy, edited by Katz, Nathan, 54-79. Atlantic
Highlands: Humanities Press.
———. 1988. "On Translating the Term "Drstanta" in Early Buddhist Formal Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 38 (2):147-156.
"The discussion of problems in the translation of "Nyaya/Pramana Vada" terms into their possible English target expressions remains relevant for philosophers because to translate
such terms is to presuppose some implicit interpretations of formalistic logic. This takes us beyond the confines of traditional Indology to philosophical questions about comparative formal
Eckel, Malcolm D. 1978. "Bhavaviveka and the Early Madhyamika Theories of Language." Philosophy East and West no. 28 (3):323-337.
"Evidence from Bhavaviveka's Orajnapradipa and Tarkajvala is used to show that Bhavaviveka makes an important contribution to the understanding of Nagarjuna's arguments about the
foundations of language. Bhavaviveka's arguments are then compared and contrasted with those of Candrakirti and Tsong-kha-pa."
Ellingson-Waugh, Ter. 1974. "Algebraic and Geometric Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 24 (1):23-40.
Fujinaga, Sin. 1990. "Determining Which Jaina Philosopher Was the Object of Dharmakirti's Criticisms." Philosophy East and West no. 50 (3):378-384.
Galloway, Brian. 1989. "Some Logical Issues in Madhyamaka Thought." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 17:1-35.
"In this paper we should like to argue that the "Prasajya" negation of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy is not the same as that of the non-Madhyamaka schools (that is,
that the distinction between "Prasajya" and "Paryudasa" negation is not drawn in the same way). We should also like to argue that the terms and concepts of elementary set theory, employed in
conjunction with the elementary predicate calculus, are useful in the explication of the laws of the excluded middle and of contradiction and also in the clarification of the "Catuskoti". Finally we
shall defend the Madhyamika Nagarjuna against two charges that have been laid against him to the effect that he has been guilty of certain errors of reasoning."
Gillon, Brendan S. 1997. "Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts." In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria,
Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 128-149. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
"Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and America have not been the only philosophers to have been
perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the reflections of these classical Indian philosophers, transposed into the
contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts
and knowledge of them, which, when so transposed, is very plausible indeed.
I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which European and American philosophers have
given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely
paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an
important part of classical Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who maintained
that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by
Gupta, Rita. 1980. "The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness and Its Presuppositions." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:47-68.
"The article first examines the arguments with the help of which philosophers like Dharmakirti established the doctrine of momentariness. The article later proceeds to examine some
of the basic presuppositions of the doctrine which are: (I) causal efficacy must be the intrinsic property of a cause, (II) there is no such thing as an unrealized capacity, (III) causal efficacy is
the hall mark of the real as opposed to the unreal, and (IV) the identity of a thing is destroyed not only if it happens to be concurrently invested with two contradictory properties, it is destroyed
even if the contradictories characterize the thing (at different times)."
———. 1985. "Apoha and the Nominalist/Conceptualist Controversy." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 13:383-398.
Herzberger, Hans G. 1975. "Double Negation in Buddhist Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 3:3-16.
"The Apoha doctrine of Dignaga and his followers, presents a fascinating logical puzzle. While rejecting the classical law of double negation, it nevertheless requires a partial
semantic equivalence between expression and their double negations. None of the principal nonstandard concepts of negation (classical, intuitionistic, three-valued) can do justice to this complex
position. this paper undertakes a semantic reconstruction of the Apoha doctrine, using methods derived from Emil Post's work on the foundations of many-valued logic, especially the notion of a
Herzberger, Radikha, and Herzberger, Hans G. 1997. "Two Truths, or One?" In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria,
Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 278-300. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
"Thomas Mann begins his essay on Schopenhauer by telling us that the pleasures of metaphysics are mainly aesthetic.
Without sharing that high degree of philosophical detachment, we acknowledge that the present essay was motivated by aesthetic as well as historical concerns. Because it is part of
an effort to understand Indian philosophers as particular individuals with distinctive problem situations and doctrines it is properly classified as historical. Because it aims to locate particular
doctrines within larger philosophical, visions, it might also be classified as aesthetic. Our essay develop's a long perspective going back to the early origins of pramâna theory. Drawing
the reader back in time puts us in a better position to trace historical sources for certain important ideas of Dharmakirti and Dinnaga, and to contrast the treatment of those ideas in their
respective philosophical systems."
Huntington, C.W.Jr. 1983. "A "Nonreferential" View of Language and Conceptual Thought in the Work of Tson-Kha-Pa." Philosophy East and West no. 33 (4):325-339.
"Part one of the work briefly describes Wittgenstein's theory of nonreferential meaning, as presented in Gudmunsen's "Wittgenstein and Buddhism". This theory is then applied to the
interpretation of an essay by Tson-kha-pa dealing with the "two truths." Part two is an annotated translation of the Tson-kha-pa piece."
Inada, Kennet K. 1988. "The Range of Buddhist Ontology." Philosophy East and West no. 38 (3):261-280.
"The essay aims at the achievement of a proper understanding of Buddhist reality based on the Buddha's original enlightenment. It expands on the three aspects: the locus of reality,
its nature and function, and its implication. This reality is a dynamic and open ontology, one that focuses on the momentary nature of ordinary experience. It is a unique ontology which finally
affirms the universal nature of the doctrine of emptiness which, in turn, opens up new directions in both ideological and cultural pursuits."
Lance, Factor R. 1983. "What Is the "Logic" in Buddhist Logic?" Philosophy East and West no. 33 (2):183-188.
"In opposition to a contemporary interpretation of the influential Buddhist logic text, "Nyayapravesa" (Introduction to logical methods, circa 600 a. D.) which holds that its
argument forms are not deductive and hence not comparable to Western notions of logic, I argue that its basic syllogisms are retroductive-deductive pairs. A Nyaya syllogism is virtually identical
with the retroductive form expounded by C.S. Peirce and N. Hanson."
Lindtner, Christian. 1981. "Atisa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:161-214.
"This paper presents a survey and an annotated translation (from Tibetan and Sanskrit) of the main Buddhist documents from II-X century a. D. dealing with the 'two truths', or two
degrees of reality: a relative and an absolute. The former is the empirical world known to us through the senses and the usage of language. Submitted to sustained critical analysis it proves to be
devoid of logical and ontological foundation. Enlightened individuals realizing that there is thus in fact only one truth -- the absolute -- nevertheless avail themselves of the convention of
language in order to indicate what cannot be communicated but only 'personally intuited.' Thus the relative truth is pedagogically indispensable."
Liu, Ming-wood. 1993. "A Chinese Madhyamaka Theory of Truth: The Case of Chi-Tsang." Philosophy East and West no. 43 (4):649-673.
"Chi-tsang (549-623) was the key figure in the revival of Chinese Madhyamaka in the late sixth century, and his teaching is commonly acknowledged to be the apex of the development
of Madhyamaka thought in China. This essay attempts to examine the conception of truth underlying a number of ideas generally considered as central to Chi-tsang's thought, including "refutation of
falsehood", "revelation of truth" and "two truths"."
Loy, David. 1984. "How Not to Criticize Nagarjuna: A Response to L. Stafford Betty." Philosophy East and West no. 34 (4):437-445.
Manchester, Rogers Katherine. 2009. Tibetan Logic. Ithaca: Snow Lions Publications.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1970. "Reference and Existence in Nyaya and Buddhist Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:83-108.
"This Nyaya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about 'existence' and 'denotation'. The Nyaya and the
Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyaya interpreted "the rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex
attributing 'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The rabbit's horn does not exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and is true. This analysis is
closer to Russell's theory of description. The Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very different from
Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyaya believed that any object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either real or analyzable into constituents which are ultimately
identifiable with some real entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists, however, hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."
Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Evans, Robert D., eds. 1986. Buddhist Logic and Epistemology. Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language. Dordrecht:
McDermott, Charlene Senape A. 1969. An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of Exists. Dordrecht: Reidel.
———. 1970. "Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:22-29.
"One defense of the central tenets of Buddhist metaphysics by the Eleventh century logician, Ratnakirti, culminates in his development of a system broad enough to accommodate null
subject terms -- an achievement proleptic of contemporary free logics. The article is intended as an implicit argument in favor of the utilization of formal logical structures as tools for
explication in comparative philosophy."
Mortensen, Chris. 2004. "Dharmakirti and Priest on Change." Philosophy East and West no. 54 (1):20-28.
Competing accounts of change and motion are given by the seventh-century Buddhist logician Dharmakirti and the contemporary analytical philosopher Graham Priest. They agree on much,
but disagree on the issue of the Law of Non-Contradiction. Priest takes Dharmakirti's side, appealing to current space-time theory, while making some qualifications."
Nakamura, Hajime. 1958. "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies no. 7:375-395.
———. 1987. Indian Buddhism. A Survey with Bibliographical Notes. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
First edition: Japan 1980.
Chapter V. Logicians pp. 294-311.
Ng Yu, Kwan. 1987. "The Arguments of Nagarjuna in the Light of Modern Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:363-384.
Payne, Richard K. 1987. "The Theory of Meaning in Buddhist Logicians: The Historical and Intellectual Context of Apoha." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:261-284.
Perdue, Daniel E. 1992. Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.
Potter, Karl H., ed. 1999. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 8. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Potter, Karl H., Buswell, Robert Jr., Jaini, Padmanabh S., and Ross, Reat Noble, eds. 1996. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 7. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Rajnish, Mishra. 2000. "Buddhist Theory of Meaning." In Signs and Signification. Vol. Ii, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 337-358. New Delhi: Bahri
Robinson, Richard H. 1967. "The Classical Indian Axiomatic." Philosophy East and West no. 17 (1-4):139-154.
Santina, Peter Della. 1987. "The Madhyamaka Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:173-185.
"The paper attempts to provide a brief but complete history of the conceptual development of the Madhyamaka system in India from Nagarjuna to Shantarakshita and Kamalashila,
including the controversy between the Prasangika and the Svatantrika Schools and the emergence of the synthetic Yogacara-Madhyamaka school. The Madhyamaka system represents the quintessence of the
critical attitude in Buddhist philosophy. Nonetheless, in the course of its development, it exhibited logical and idealistic tendencies as well as analytical ones."
Sharma, Dhirendra. 1968. "Buddhist Theory of Meaning ( Apoha) and Negative Statements." Philosophy East and West no. 18 (1-2):3-10.
Shaw, Jaysankar Lal. 1974. "Empty Terms: The Nyaya and the Buddhists." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 2:332-343.
"The purpose of this paper is to explain the Buddhists' conception of empty term, which is linked up with their conception of Sunyata, and to answer some of the questions raised by
certain contemporary writers on Nyaya and Buddhism. Moreover, the aim is to show an important function of language which is embedded in the Buddhist philosophy as a whole. A comparison between
Russell and the Nyaya has been drawn, and some of the questions raised by Quine have been discussed in this context."
———. 1978. "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 6:59-77.
"The aim of this paper is to explain and reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning which is formulated in terms of double negation. The Buddhist theory of meaning requires two
types of negation for expressing the meaning of an expression. This discussion leads us to an investigation of the different senses of negation used in Indian logic. The first section deals with the
different classifications of negation. The second section deals with professor Herzberger's explication of the Buddhist theory of meaning. According to our positive thesis the theory of meaning can
be reconstructed in terms of two senses of negation."
Siderits, Mark. 1979. "A Note on the Early Buddhist Theory of Truth." Philosophy East and West no. 29 (4):491-499.
———. 1980. "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology (First Part)." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:307-336.
"A stock objection to the Madhyamaka project of establishing a null ontology is that any knowledge claim requires the existence of objects of knowledge. Here I describe the Nyaya
formulation of this objection. Nagarjuna's response, that the theory of knowledge cannot supply us with metaphysical truths, is examined in detail. Finally, I consider the Nyaya defense of
epistemology, concluding that it misses the point of Nagarjuna's objection."
———. 1981. "The Madhyamaka Critique of Epistemology (Second Part)." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:121-160.
———. 1985. "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Apoha." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 13:133-152.
"I show that the Buddhist philosophers Santaraksita and Kamalasila subscribed to the Indian equivalent of the context principle, according to which a word has meaning only in the
context of a sentence. I then discuss the manner in which they used the Buddhist exclusion (Apoha) theory of meaning to answer two major objections to that account of word meaning: the "hermeneutic
circle" objection, and the objection that this account cannot explain our ability to understand novel sentences."
Stcherbatsky, Fedor Ippolitovich. 1930. Buddhist Logic. Leningrad: Academy of sciences of the U.S.S.R.
Two volumes (1930-1932).
Vol.2 includes "A short treatise of logic (Nyaya-bindu) by Dharmakirti with its commentary (Nyaya-bindu-tika) by Dharmottara translated from the Sanscrit text edited in the
Reprinted: New York, Dover Publications, 1962; Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1992.
Steinkellner, Ernst, ed. 1991. Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition. Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakirti Conference, Vienna, June 11-16, 1989.
Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Tillemans, Tom J.F. 1984. "Two Tibetan Texts on the "Neither One nor Many" Argument for "Sunyata"." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:357-388.
"This is my third article in a series on a Buddhist Madhyamaka argument for "voidness", that is the impossibility of entities existing themselves. For the previous two articles, see
E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.) "Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy", Vienna 1983, and "Etudes de lettres", 3, University of Lausanne 1982. The present article
consists of an annotated translation and a critical edition of sections from two Tibetan texts."
———. 1989. "Formal and Semantic Aspects of Tibetan Buddhist Debate Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 17:265-297.
———. 1999. Scripture, Logic, Language. Essays on Dharmakirti and His Tibetan Successors. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Contents: Series Editor's Preface: E. Gene Smith; Acknowledgments and notes on the bibliographic sources; Abbreviations; Introduction; Scripturally based argumentation. 1.
Dharmakirti, Aryadeva and Dharmapala on scriptural suthority 27; 2. How much of a proof is scripturally based inference? 37; 3. Pre-Dharmakirti Commentators on the definition of a thesis 53; Logic;
4. On Pararthanumana, Theses and syllogisms 69; 5. On Sapaksa 89; 6. Formal and semantic aspects of Tibetan Buddhist debate logic 117; 7. Dharmakirti and Tibetans on Adrsyanupalabdhihetu 151; 8. What
is the Svadharmin in Buddhist logic? 171; 9. Is Buddhist logic non-classical or deviant? 187; Philosophy of language; 10. On the so-called difficult point of the Apoha theory 209; 11. What can one
reasonably say about nonexistence? (with Donald S. Lopez, Jr.) 247; Bibliography 285; Index 301.
Tillemans, Tom J.F., and Lopez, Donald S.Jr. 1998. "What Can One Reasonably Say About Nonexistence? A Tibetan Work on the Problem of Asrayasiddha." Journal of Indian
Philosophy no. 26:99-129.
Tucci, Giuseppe. 1929. "Buddhist Logic before Dinnaga (Asanga, Vasubandhu, Tarka-Sastras)." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland:451-488.
Waldo, Ives. 1975. "Nagarjuna and Analytic Philosophy." Philosophy East and West no. 25 (3):281-290.
Walser, Joseph. 1998. "On the Formal Arguments of the Akutobhaya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 26:189-232.
"Though the Madhyamika school of Buddhism begins with Nagarjuna's Mula Madhyamakakarika, modern scholar's interpretations of this work rely heavily on the commentaries of
Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti. These commentaries each reflect the so-called "Svatantrika-vs-Prasangika" debate, which became a Madhyamika preoccupation in later times. There are,
however, two earlier commentaries which have been largely ignored. This article will demonstrate that one of these commentaries, theAkutobhaya, gives us a rendering of Nagarjuna's logic that is
perhaps closer to Nagarjuna's own milieu than post-Dignaga commentaries, such as those of Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka. In this article, I show the ways that the formal argumentation of the Akutobhaya
differs from the post-Dignaga logic and seems to conform more closely to an earlier standard set by the early Nyaya and Samkhya schools of logic. The result of this difference in logical methodology
is subtle, but nevertheless has ramifications for Madhyamika doctrine."
Watanabe, Fumimaro. 1983. Philosophy and Its Development in the Nikayas and Abhidhamma. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Wayman, Alex. 1999. A Millennium of Buddhist Logic. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"This is volume one of texts (from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources) of the two planned volumes on Buddhist Ligic (the second volume to be on topics and opponents). This first volume is
in two parts: Part I (Introductory) has Asanga's rules of debate, Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu with Kamalasila's commentary, and Santi-pa's treatise on 'inner pervasion. Part II, devoted to the
Dignaga-Dharmakirti system, has five sets of eleven verses, then a study of Bu-Ston's commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscaya, and finally Tsong-kha-pa's Mum sel on the seven books of
Dharmakirti. The 'Millennium' goes from Asanga to Tsongkha-pa. The texts here included began to be translated in the 1970s, were all in draft renditions in the 1980s, and were brought to their
present condition in the 1990s. Doubtless the present volume took longer than originally anticipated, and hopefully this published result will compensate for the many years of delay."
Williams, Paul M. 1980. "Some Aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:1-45.
"The word 'Prajnapti' in the Madhyamaka designates the status of an entity which has no existence apart from that postulated to fulfill the requirements of linguistic reference. the
'prajnapti' is the referent of a term with no ultimate referent, and is created by language due to the requirement that all terms have referents in order to be meaningful. 'Samjna' involves the
classification of a perceptual given in terms of a verbalized subject-predicate formula. The requirement for a referent of the terms involved is fulfilled through the operation of 'Kalpana', and this
constructive operation seen as the creation of a semi-permanent entity is referred to under the aspect of 'Parikalpa'. The paper also treats 'Prapanca' and, briefly, 'Drsti'."
———. 1981. "On the Abhidharma Ontology." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:227-257.
"The Sarvastivada ontology maintained that all of which could be an intentional object of consciousness and verbally characterized must exist. Existing solely with self-essence was
necessary in order to allow for imagination, memory and the atemporal referring of uniquely individuating descriptions. These entities are primary existents and are constructed into the
spatio-temporal everyday world. For a primary existent to be spatio-temporally instantiated is the same thing as for it to be effective, and this sort of existence was radically distinguished from
existing simply possessed of self-essence. Secondary existence is constructed out of these as the sort of existence required by non-uniquely individuating intentional acts."